Papers of John Adams, volume 20

To John Adams from George Washington, 27 August 1790 Washington, George Adams, John

From George Washington

Sir, New York, August 27th: 1790.

Being very desireous of obtaining such aids and information as will enable me to form a just opinion upon the subject of the enclosed paper, in case the events therein mentioned should take place; I have taken the liberty to submit it to you for your consideration, requesting that you will favor me with an opinion thereon.1

With very great esteem & regard / I am / Sir, / Your most Obedt: Hbe. Servt.

Go: Washington

ENCLOSURE

(Secret) United States August 27th: 1790

Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain should come to the decision of Arms, from a variety of circumstances (individually unimportant and inconclusive, but very much the reverse when compared and combined) there is no doubt in my mind, that New Orleans and the Spanish Posts above it on the Mississippi will be among the first attempts of the former, and that the reduction of them will be undertaken by a combined operation from Detroit.2

The Consequences of having so formidable and enterprising a people as the British on both our flanks and rear, with their navy in front, as they respect our Western settlements which may be seduced thereby, as they regard the Security of the Union and its commerce with the West Indies, are too obvious to need enumeration.

What then should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march Troops through the Territory of the said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?3

What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?

Mr. Adams will oblige the President of the United States by giving his opinion in writing on the above statement.

Go: Washington

RC and enclosure (Adams Papers); internal address: “Mr. Adams—” and “Mr. Adams.”; docketed by JA: “No. 1.” and “No. 2.”

410 1.

With minor alterations in wording, Washington sent the same query to his entire cabinet. Most of them replied immediately, anxious to resolve the first test of American neutrality. JA, John Jay, and Henry Knox all cited law of nations theory—especially the works of jurists Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius, and Samuel von Pufendorf—and strongly advised sitting out the Nootka Sound conflict until either Great Britain or Spain formally approached with a request to move troops through American territory. Thomas Jefferson outlined a more aggressive path of preemptive denial, to be underlined by force if necessary. Alexander Hamilton, replying a month later, upheld the majority view. Just as JA observed in his reply of 29 Aug., below, Hamilton emphasized that the United States lacked the military, the money, and the popular support needed to go to war. He wrote: “There are causes which render war in this country more expensive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on than in any other. There is a general disinclination to it in all classes” (Washington, Papers, Presidential Series , 6:353–361, 439–460). See also Descriptive List of Illustrations, No. 6, above.

Spain held regional posts in St. Louis and Natchez, Mississippi (Abernethy, The South in the New Nation , p. 208).

False rumors that Benedict Arnold was reviewing the Detroit, Mich., militia fueled concern that the British planned to invade Spanish Louisiana. Arnold, however, was mired in a series of lawsuits in St. John, New Brunswick, Canada, during 1790 (vol. 19:48; Washington, Papers, Presidential Series , 6:344–345).

From John Adams to George Washington, 29 August 1790 Adams, John Washington, George

To George Washington

Sir New York August 29 1790

That New Orleans, and the Spanish Posts on the Missisippi, will be among the first attempts of the English, in case of a war with Spain, appears very probable: and that a combined operation from Detroit, would be convenient to that end cannot be doubted.

The Consequences, on the western Settlements, on the commerce with the West Indies, and on the general Security and tranquility of the American confederation, of having them in our rear, and on both our flanks, with their navy in front, are very obvious.

The interest of the United States duely weighed, and their Duty conscientiously considered, point out to them, in the case of Such a War, a neutrality, as long as it may be practicable. The People of these States would not willingly Support a War, and the present Government has not Strength to command, nor enough of the general1 Confidence of the nation to draw the men or money necessary, untill the Grounds, causes and Necessity of it Should become generally2 known, and universally approved. A pacific Character, in opposition to a warlike temper, a Spirit of Conquest, or a disposition to military Enterprize, is of great importance to us to preserve in Europe: and therefore We Should not engage even in defensive War, untill the Necessity of it, Should become apparent, or at least until We have it in our Power to make it manifest, in Europe as well as at home.

In order to preserve an honest Neutrality, or even the Reputation 411 of a disposition to it, the United States must avoid as much as possible, every real Wrong, and even every Appearance of Injury to either Party. To grant to Lord Dorchester in case he Should request it, permission to march troops through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the Missisippi, would not only have an appearance offensive to the Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a real Injury to Spain. The Answer therefore to his Lordship Should be a refusal, in terms clear and decided, but guarded and dignified, in a manner, which no Power has more at command than the President of the United States.

If a measure So daring offensive and hostile, as the march of Troops through our Territory to Attack a Friend, Should be hazarded by the English, without leave, or especially after a refusal, it is not So easy to answer the Question, what notice ought to be taken of it.

The Situation of our Country is not like that of most3 of the nations in Europe. They have generally large numbers of Inhabitants in narrow territories: We have Small numbers Scattered over vast regions. The Country through which the Brittons4 must pass from Detroit to the Missisippi, is, I Suppose, so thinly inhabited, and at Such a distance from all the populous Settlements, that it would be impossible for the President of the United States to collect Militia or march troops Sufficient to resist the Enterprize. After the Step shall have been taken there are but two Ways for Us to proceed one is War and the other negotiation. Spain would probably remonstrate to the President of the United States but whether she should or not, the President of the United States should remonstrate to the King of Great Britain. It would not be expected I Suppose by our Friends or Ennemies that the United States should declare War at once. Nations are not obliged to declare War for every Injury or even Hostility. A tacit Acquiescence under Such an Outrage, would be misinterpreted on all hands; by Spain as inimical to her and by Brittain,5 as the effect of Weakness, Disunion and Pusillanimity. Negotiation then is the only other Alternative.

Negotiation in the present State of Things is attended with peculiar difficulties. As the King of Great Britain, twice proposed to the United States, an Exchange of Ministers, once through Mr Hartley and once through the Duke of Dorsett, and when the United states agreed to the Proposition, flew from it: to Send a Minister again to st James’s till that Court explicitly promises to send one to America is an humiliation to which the United States ought never to Submit.6 412 A Remonstrance from Sovereign to sovereign cannot be Sent, but by an Ambassador of some order or other: from Minister of State to Minister of State, it must be transmitted in many other Ways: A Remonstrance in the form of a Letter from the American Minister of State to the Duke of Leeds, or whoever may be Secretary of State for foreign affairs, might be transmitted, through an Envoy, Minister Plenipotentiary, or Ambassador of the President of the United States, at Paris, Madrid or the Hague and through the British Ambassador at either of these Courts. The Utmost length, that can be now gone, with Dignity would be to send a Minister to the Court of London, with Instructions7 to present his Credentials, demand an Audience, make his Remonstrance, but to make no Establishment and demand his audience of leave and quit the Kingdom in one, two or three Months if a Minister of equal degree were not appointed and actually sent to the President of the United States, from the King of Great Britain.

It is a Misfortune that in these critical moments and Circumstances, the United States have not a Minister of large Veiws, mature Age Information and Judgment, and Strict Integrity at the Courts of France Spain London and the Hague.8 Early and authentick Intelligence from those Courts may be of more importance than the Expence: but as the Representatives of the People, as well as of the Legislatures, are of a different opinion they have made a very Scanty Provision for but a part of Such a system. As it is, God knows where the Men are to be found who are qualified for Such Missions and would undertake them. By an Experience of ten Years which made me too unhappy9 at the time to be ever forgotten, I know, that every Artifice which can deceive, every temptation which can operate on hope or fear, Ambition or Avarice, Pride or Vanity, the Love of Society Pleasure or Amusement will be employed to divert and warp them from the true line of their Duty and the impartial honour and interest of their Country.

To the Superiour Lights and Information derived from office; the more Serene10 temper and profound Judgment of the President of the United States, these crude and hasty thoughts11 concerning the Points proposed, are humbly Submitted, with every sentiment of respect and / Sincere attachment, by his most obedient / and most humble servant

John Adams12

RC (DLC:Washington Papers); internal address: “The President of / the United States.”; endorsed: “From / The Vice-President / 29th. Augt. 1790.” Dft (Adams Papers). FC (Adams Papers).

413 1.

In the Dft, JA wrote “unanimous.”

In the Dft, JA wrote “publick and notorious.”

In the Dft, JA wrote “any.”

In the Dft, JA wrote “English.”

In the Dft, JA wrote “England.”

For David Hartley’s and the Duke of Dorset’s proposals for the exchange of ministers, see vol. 17:19–20.

In the Dft, JA added here, “not to present his Credentials nor ask an Audience untill a Minister of equal Degree should be appointed at st James’s to come to the United States, and with further Instructions to quit the Kingdom, without communicating his Credentials, to the King if a Counter Minister were not appointed within one Month.”

Of the cabinet members who replied to Washington with advice on the Nootka Sound conflict, only JA and John Jay used the opportunity to advocate for sustaining and deepening the American diplomatic presence in Europe. On 22 Dec. 1791 Washington nominated Gouverneur Morris to serve as U.S. minister to France and William Short as minister to the Netherlands. Senators debated the merits and expenses of maintaining resident diplomats before confirming both appointments in mid-Jan. 1792. Morris served until 1794; Short was reassigned to Spain, where he was the U.S. minister from 1794 to 1796 (U.S. Senate, Exec. Jour. , 2d Cong., 1st sess., p. 92, 93, 96, 98; 3d Cong., 1st sess., p. 157; 4th Cong., 1st. sess., p. 269).

In the Dft, JA wrote “miserable.”

10.

In the Dft, JA wrote “calm” but then canceled it and interlined “Serene.”

11.

In the Dft, JA added “which contain the best opines he can form.”

12.

Following the advice of JA and others, the president’s decision to wait out the negotiations at Madrid proved fruitful, and French nullity proved fortunate. By late October the British and Spanish negotiators had hammered out the first of three Nootka Sound conventions, formed between 1790 and 1794, that opened the territory to both nations for trade. Widely hailed as a British diplomatic win, the Nootka Sound conflict demonstrated the Triple Alliance’s military power and, more critically, eroded the longstanding belief that land claims must be supported by settlement (Black, British Foreign Policy , p. 233–256).