That which gaue me occasion first to enquire after a Rule for prescript penaltyes, was the inequalitye I sawe in some prescribed sentences vpon the breache of diverse morall Lawes: and proceedinge in this enquirye, I kept my intention still vpon that subiect, without respect to suche Lawes as are meerly positiue, hauinge their Authoritye onely and wholly from humane Institution: therefore you shall find that all my instances are of that kinde, and all my Arguments looke that waye, as in the Instances I bringe of the Lawes of England. If I had intended the positiue and Statute Lawes, it had been a great mistake, for I knowe well that most of the later Statute Lawes haue their penaltyes prescribed, and it must needs be so, for suche as are meerly positiue, for a Judge can haue no Rule for his sentence vpon the 487breache of suche a Lawe, except he have it from the Lawe it self: as for instance, if the Lawe which forbidds any man to kill an hare or partridge with a gunne, had not allso sett downe the penaltye, the Judge could not have founde out any, which might have been iust because no Lawe of God or nature makes suche an Acte any offence or transgression. But for the Comon Lawes of England (which are the ancient Lawes and of farre more esteem for their wisdome and equity, then the statute Lawes) they had no penaltyes prescribed, and it may be conceived that for suche of them as were grounded vpon the worde of God, and the Light of nature, there must needs be that in the same worde and in the same light of nature (especially where the image of God in man is in parte renewed by Christ) which may lead vs to a iust punishment for the Transgression of such a Lawe. Nor doe I oppose all prescript penaltyes in morall cases but onely such as doe crosse some cleare Rules in the worde of God as will appeare by all my Arguments. And for avoydinge all danger to the subiect for want of prescript penaltyes in some Cases, you may see that I require some suche Lawe to be made, as may limitt Judges within such bounds of moderation, as may prevent suche dangers, and it is one of my expresse conclusions in the first page, that Judges ought to be tyed to a Rule, and suche a Rule, as may be required of them in all their Administrations, and therefore vpon what grounds I should be charged to Assert Arbitrary government, and that Judges should have Libertye to doe what they maye, I leave to your Judgments.

As for Lawes, you shall finde allso, that I conclude the necessitye of declaringe and statinge them, so as all the people may knowe them, for I ever held it vniust, to require of men the obedience to any Lawe, which they may not (by common Intendment) take notice off. Answearable heervnto hathe been my practice: All the vsefull Lawes we have, had my consent, and suche poore helpe as the Lord enabled me, to yeild to them: some of which have prescribed penaltyes, and where I have withhelde my consent to any suche penaltyes, I haue giuen my reasons for it, which have been suche, as in some Cases have satisfied the Court, and heerin I have taken no more libertye then is allowed to every member of the Court. I will not iustifie every passage in my booke: there are 2 or 3 words that offence have been taken at, and althoughe I can give a safe account of them, yet, I must confesse they doe not now please me, but where the matter is good, and the intention of the writer honest, the Lord forbidds vs to make a man an Offender in a word.

Whatsouer is erronious (I saye as I did from the first) I shall leave it to its due censure: but for all that is of God and of the Trueth, or the sincerity of my intentions heerin to the public weale, or the Libertye I had by my place 488to propounde suche considerations to the Court if these be questioned I must stand and fall with them.