Contentions among brethren are sad spectacles, among the churches of Christ, especially when they come once to favour of bitternesse, which would have discouraged me from publishing the former declaration, if I could have expected such an answer: And in that respect I should willingly have sitten downe under my reproach, if the cause of truth and justice had not called me againe to this taske; wherein, if I deale more sharply, than myne owne disposition leads me, the blame must fall upon him, who puts such occasions upon me, as I cannot otherwise shunne.

Many faults doth the Answerer find in my declaration, which I must examine as thay come in order. The “1st is, that in describing a common wealth (such as ours is) I do not describe it, as it is Christian, nor as it is founded upon the grant of our King.”

To this I replye 1st, the defininition or description of the genus may be applyed to all the species, reserving the specificall differences: To define a man to be a reasonable creature is a true definition of any man, whether rich or poor, Christian or heathen: and when I describe a common wealth in general or in a more civil or politicke respecte, the churches or Christians which are in it, fall not into consideration, as to the being of it, for it may be a true body politicke, though there be neither church nor Christian in it.

The like may be sayd for the forme of government, whether it be by patent or otherwise yet it is a government, and so the description is safe and true.

2d. The description which I make doth include all that which he doth complaine to be wanting. The words are these. A company of people, consenting to cohabite under one government, for their mutual safety and wellfare. Now let ours be layd to this description and the truth will appeare. We A. B. C. etc. consented to cohabite in the Massachusetts, and under the government set up among us by his Majesty’s patent or grant for our mutual safety and wellfare, we agreed to walke according to the rules of the gospell. And thus you have both a Christian common weale and the same founded upon the patent, and both included within my description.

I will adde only what I conceive from this and other like passages in his answer, viz. that he makes this exception rather to shelter himself under pretence of his tenderness of the kings honour and right, than out of any ignorance of the true latitude of my description; and withall he discovers how little he regardeth what jealousyes he put us under, so he may shelter his owne parties. The Lord give him to see his secret underminings, that it may be forgiven him. Having thus faulted my description, he taketh upon him to teach me a better; and for this he refers me, by a marginal quotation to Proverb 8. 5. the text is this, Oh ye simple understand wisdome and ye fools be ye of an understanding heart; and to Isai. 6. 7. And he layd it upon my mouth and sayd loe this hath touched thy lipps etc. How these places will prove his description of a Christian common wealth, founded upon the kings patent is beyond my reach, but it suits well with a practise now in use, to speak nothing but what they bring scripture for; so scripture be alledged it matters not how impertinent they be.

As for your description it self, I have no more to say against it, but that it was not requisite, to that which I projected, to expresse those particulars; 465and our lawyers will tell you that expressio eorum quae tacitè infunt nihil operatur: My intent was to prove the proprietye and priviledges of a common weale which may also belong to such government among Turkes and Pagans, so far as they may fall within my description without any prejudice to the most Christian government, that is, as if I speake of one that is an honest man, and say that he goeth upright, speakes, laughs, etc. when a Turke or a Pagan doth the same.

His next exception is, that I say “that such a body politic may use all meanes, which may conduce to their wellfare, and do not restrain it to lawful meanes.”

To this I reply, that it is according to scripture phrase, and our common speach. When we call upon a sicke man, to use meanes for his recoverye, we are well enough understood, though we put not the word lawful: I may do all things, saith Paul, and give all diligence saith Peter, without expressing lawful, which the Answerer would have understood well enough, if he had not beene minded to seeke a knot in a rush; only I see not why he should passe over those many things which he saith are questionable in my ground worke, and take up those which will afford so little advantage.

Then he proceeds to examine the reasons which I layd downe to prove the equitie of this law.

The first reason is this, “If we be a corporation established by free consent, if the place of our habitation be our owne—then no man hath right to come in to us, without our consent.”

To this he answers, that “he knoweth not how we who stand a corporation by the Kings patent can thus argue.” To this I replye then. I will tell him, that which the King is pleased to bestow upon us, and we have accepted, is truly our owne.

2. He denyeth the consequence by a distinction of a consent regulated, and a vast and illimited consent.

Replye: To speake of consent in general, implyeth alwayes a consent suitable to the power or interest of him who is to give it; as when we say, a child may not marrye without consent of parents, we know it is regulated, yet when a father pleads it, he doth not neede to expresse all the limitations.

Thus he runs on in a frivolous discourse, and in the end falls upon this false conclusion, “An unlawful dissent can hinder no man,” So that if he had need to borrow my horse, and I ought by the rule of love to lend him to him, though I refuse to consent to his request herein, yet he may take him, because my dissent is unlawfully; so by this conclusion a wife, a childe, a servant may doe any thinge that is lawfull, though the husband, father, or maister 466deny their consent. If this speed well, the next conclusion will be an anarchie.

After this discourse I expected somewhat to have taken away the consequence of my argument, but I finde not a word to that purpose, he is suddainly fallen upon my second reason, which is this,

“If no man hath right to our land, etc. but by our consent, then it is reason we should take nottice of men, before we conferre any such upon them.”

This he partly grants, but complaines of the change of the question, to which I replye that I did not propound any reasons in a syllogisticall frame, but by way of discourse, and that which this argument tends unto was only to shew why some were not presently allowed, but a time taken, wherein we might gayne some nottice and tryall of them, and there was no need why the answerer should so often complaine of the change of the question; for if he takes my reasons together he cannot denye but the question itselfe is argued and concluded, as will appeare by the sequell, I will therefore passe by all that he strives about, upon this supposed fallacie, and joyne with him in the question, as he states it, viz.

Whether the admitting or rejecting of persons should depend upon the discretions of men, which he calls an unlimitted and unsafe rule and their discretion not regulated, though they should be magistrates.

To this I replye, or rather answere, first, That which he takes for granted, and wherein lyes the whole strength of his defence is untrue, viz. That the magistrates will and discretion in our case is not regulated, for 1st, the magistrates are members of the churches here and, by that covenant, are regulated to direct all their wayes by the rule of the gospell, and if they faile in any thinge, they are subject to the churches correction. 2dly. As they are freemen, they are regulated by oath, to direct their aymes to the wellfare of this civill body. 3dly. As they are magistrates, they are sworne to doe right to all, and regulated by their relation to the people, to seeke their wellfare in all things; so as here is no such irregulated discretion as is supposed, and it seems to me an improper speech and favouring of contradiction; for discretion alwayes implyes a rule for its guide. And herein I have occasion to take in his answere so my 4th reason drawne from the practice of our churches, and some towns where matters of admitting or rejecting are ordered by discretion. And here it is made a wonder that I shew so much ignorance. I must confesse my ignorance is greate, and I cannot hide it, being exposed so much as I am to publick view: Yet that will not cover the answerers blindness, from prejudice in this greate wonder, which is such as he cannot discerne the voyce and will of Christ dispenced in the discretion of his servants and people, and yet tells us not how it should be knowne otherwise. Did he never heare, that our practise 467is, that none are propounded to the congregation, except they be first allowed by the elders, and is not this to admitt or reject by discretion? Did he never heare of a Christian man rejected by the church, or put off at least, because a brother hath professed want of satisfaction? Hath he never heard that the dissent of some few brethren may, by rule, (as hath beene sayd) cause the rejection of a man, whom all the rest of the brethren shall approve of? And where is Christs voyce to be heard now, if he will have discretion shut out of the church. So says the instance of townes matters (which he wisely declines and gives no answer to) he well knowes that within the towne of Boston it is an established order, that none should be received into cohabitation there, except they be allowed by certain men appointed to judge of their fitness for church-fellowship. And so, whereas the way of God hath alwayes beene to gather his churches out of the world; now, the world, or civill state, must be raised out of the churches. And yet the answerer can finde nothing of wonder of ignorance here. And if he had enquired of our neighbours at Plymouth, they could have tould him that their practice hath beene upon the like law, for many yeares, I mean in referring it to the discretion of the magistrates to receive and reject such as come to them. And if he had considered of a rule in the law of Moses, he should finde that there is power given to a husband or father to allow or make void any vow of a wife or childe at their discretion, yet I hope he will not call this a vast and unlimitted rule.

But because the word discretion seems so offensive and unsafe, let us trye it by the ballance of the sanctuarye, if we can finde it to hold weight there, sure it will prove a good measure for civill affaires.

The word in scripture is sometymes taken for sound reason, as Psal. 112. 5. He will order his affaires by discretion; so Pro. 11. 12. Sometymes for skill, as Pro. 2. 11. Pro. 3. 21. Sometymes for judgment, Phill. 1. 9. And in all places in a good fence, for it is a gift of God wherein he despenseth his own wisdome in all the affairs of men, both in church and common wealth; all lawes are made by discretion, and the equitie of them is found out and applyed to particular cases by discretion; by it (being guided by the spirit of God) the mynde and will of God is found out in his word, Acts 5. 8 and Acts 8. 23. Acts 15. 38. Acts 21, 23. Levit. 27. 8, 12. So for judgment in civil causes; by discretion did Solomon judge betweene the harlots. It is not possible to provide a law that in the letter of it shall reach every case which may fall out, as we see by the law of God it selfe in the same place of Levit. 27. 8. then it must rest in the discretion of the judge to discerne, so doth the Lord himselfe appointe, Deut. 17. 8, 9. etc. they are to do as the judge shall determine, and that which he shall declare for law, that must they obey, otherwise there could 468be no determination in hard and doubtful cases. As for these scriptures which the Answerer alledgeth about Christ his souerainty, etc. they are nothing to the question; for the prerogative authority of Christ in all affaires in church and common wealth, doth not hinder the manner of his dispensations of the ministry of his servants, and in the improvement of such gifts of his, of wisdome, discretion, etc. as he is pleased to exercise his authority in, according to the rule of his word.

My 5th reason is, that it is no sinne or injury to deny a man that which he hath no right unto, therefore we may denye some men place amongst us. In the answer, there is againe complainte of changing the question, because I go about to prove that some men may be rejected, which he seemeth to grant, and if so then that which he maketh the maine question will easily be cleared, for if we may reject some, then the care of this must be committed to some persons, for to speak of discerning Christ his authority in church or common wealth, otherwise than as it is dispensed in the ministry of men, is a meer idea or fantasye. If then it must be committed to some persons, to whom may it more properly than to the fathers of the common wealth? And if it cannot be foreseene who are to be received and who to be rejected, those persons must be trusted with the tryall of them, and if no certaine rule can be set downe which may be sufficient to discerne of every man, then must it be committed to their discretion, regulated by the word of God, and the dutye of their place, which they are bound to observe. And whereas the Answerer cryes out against this course as vast, illimitted, sinefull and injurious, and yet will not (and cannot) prescribe us a better, neither in his answer, nor at the court when he opposed the makeing of this law, may we not safely judge that such opposition and those reproachful termes as are cast from it, upon an ordinance of God, in the faces of those whom he would have to be had in honor for his sake, proceed rather from distemper of minde, than from any just cause of offence?

Now here I might strike him with his owne weappon, for when he seekes to prove that any of the kings subjects have right by our patent to come and plant in places not inhabited, he changes the question indeed, for both the law and our dispute have beene about entertaining into houses and townes, and not into places not inhabited. That question may fall to be discussed upon some other occasion.

Againe (that we may take notice how his zeale for the cause outrunes his judgment) he gives to all the kings Christian subjects a right to plant among us, by vertue of our patent, and such a right as by misusage whereof they may forfeit the patent, and here he might fitly have brought in his vast and illimitted termes, had he not misplaced them, for hast, for there was never seene 469such a vast patent of incorporation as should comprehend all the kings Christian subjects, which is as large as if he had said all his subjects.

But that others may see his errour, if he himselfe will not, let the patent be perused, and there it will be found, that the incorporation is made to certaine persons by name, and unto such as they shall associate to themselves, and all this tract of land is granted to them and their associates: And after this he gives leave to any of his subjects to depart out of other dominions to this place: So then the case standeth thus, the 10 men of Boston allow a strainger to sit downe among them, yet this gives him no right to any mans house or land, nor to any lot in the towne, till it be granted him, nor to any privilege there till he be made free; we must have a new fort of reason to make this a good argument; the King gives a man leave to inhabite in the incorporate colony of the Massachusets, ergo, he hath hereby right to the lands there. His discourse about the matter of general right by patent is so confused and irrational, as I should but waste tyme and paper to follow him in it, valeat ut valere potest. I finde nothing in it which may endainger my argument, except it be put out of countenance, by a false clamour of robbery, vexation, oppression, etc. as if the state here went about to take from men their lawful right and expell them from their houses, etc.

The 6th reason is this, if straingers have right to our houses, etc. then it is either of justice or of mercye, etc.

The answerer, after his wonted prejudice of change of the question, undertakes to prove, “that some straingers have right in justice by the Kings patent,” only he restraineth it to cohabitation and sojourning (which will conclude nothing for him, seeing this law doth not shutt out all straingers) The reasons he bringeth are three, the 1st, because they are fellow-subjects, 2dly, because they are of the same nation, 3dly, because they are Christians.

To this I replye, that I have alreadye cleared this pointe in laying open the extent and meaneing of the patent, and this I may say further, that I have reade over all the lawes of England and all the general customes and privileges of the Kings subjects there, but I have not found any thinge that may give the least colour for such a priviledge as is pretended.

As for that of christianitye I have granted in my declaration that there is a right of hospitalitye, but for other right of cohabitation or sojourning it must be considered in such special cases, as may fall out and cannot be provided for by general rule.

My 7th reason is drawne from the proportion or resemblance that a common-wealth hath to a familye, which is not bound to entertaine all comers, no not every good man, otherwise than by way of hospitalitye.

The answerer (his complainte of changing the question premised) seekes to disprove the proportion, by “distinguishing between the right which the maister of a familye hath to his house, etc. and the right which this common wealth hath to all the houses, etc. within this patent.” This he amplyfyes by particular instances, “1. in power of bequeathing them to his wife and children. 2. In regard of the King’s right. 3. In respect of such as are no members, etc. and yet have right to their houses, etc. 4. In regard to such as have protested against this law.”

To this I replye, that it is not needful they should hold proportion in all respects: It is sufficient if they hold in that which is intended, viz. libertye to receive or reject; which beinge knowne to all and confessed by the answerer, in granting that some may be rejected, is sufficient to make good the argument drawne from this similitude: yet to make it more cleare, I replye to these instances.

To the first I say, that a bodye politicke may leave their houses, etc. to their successors, which are in the place of their children. 2. For the Kings right, that being paramount, hinders no more in a common-wealth than it doth in a familye, for he hath the same interest in the houses, etc. of the father of a familye. 3. For such as are no members they are as sojourners in a familye, who though they have right to be in the familye themselves, yet may not receive in any to reside in their particular chambers, without consent of the matter of the familye. 4. For such as protested against this law, that protestation cometh too late (except they first convince us of the injustice of the law) seeing they formerly gave an implicite consent to all the wholesome lawes and orders of the body; neither need we feare to proclaime our right to our houses, etc. against all intruders, more than particular persons and corporations may do in England, notwithstanding his Majesties interest in them also. Such objections are not worth any answer.

In his answer to my 8th reason, viz. “Turpius eijcitur quam non admittititur sic hospes” he saith it is of humaine authority, and that my conclusions are farr from the marke.

To this I replye, that though this sentence be humaine, yet the equitye of it is strengthened by divine truths: It had been lesse griefe to Abraham not to have received Hagar to his bed then it was after to cast her out; and it was turpius for Tobija and his stuffe to be cast out of the temple, then it would if he had not been received in. Now that it may appear how farre my conclusion is from the marke, I will thus lay downe the argument. That law which shuts out such as being received in, shall be worthy to be cast out is honest and of good reporte, but this law doth so, ergo, etc.

The major proposition is proved by the examples of Hagar and Tobija, the minor I prove thus; the law provides to have such kept out as will disturbe the peace here, rightly established by the rules of Gods word, ergo, etc. except the argument may be avoyded, the conclusion will hitt the marke.

But the Answerer saith that, “1. Such ones as are intended to be kept out, are no disturbers of our peace. 2. That the law doth not declare who are to be kept out and who not.”

To these I replye first, for brevitys sake let the apologie and the remonstrance, with the coppie of the whole sermon (which himselfe delivered into the court) be compared and examined, and they shall decide the question, if you will stand to it.

To the second I replye, that yourselfe confesses who the law intended to keepe out; and though such a preamble as might have expressed the full intent, was (for want of time) omitted (which was indeed a defect) yet such as were of the court, and did well know, can make no such advantage of it, seeing the magistrates have other rules to guide them in the execution of it; and so it is warranted by scripture examples as that of our saviour Math. 16. 19. and 18. 18. whatsoever you binde on earth shall be bound in heaven etc. yet he doth not there tell them, who they ought to binde or loose.

The 9th argument is taken from that of the 2 John 10. Such as bring not the true doctrine are not to be received to house, and consequently not into the common wealth.

The Answerer (after his usual complainte of the change of the question) acknowledgeth, that if the order had been made against such it would not have been opposed; but affirmeth that it appears (by the same expressions in the court, and by the execution of the law in part) that this law is made to keepe out such as bring the true doctrine of the gospell, so that now he hath brought the question to this state, whether the opinions spread in the country, and opposed by the magistrates and elders, be the doctrines of the gospell or not, which seeing it is to be decyded by the synod assembled, it will be best to attend the issue thereof.

In his answer to the 10th reason, he doth only discourse and finde fault with a conclusion which is of his own framing (for I do not conclude that the law was only for taking notice of such as come to us, but I add also the ende of such notice, viz. for avoyding such as are to be kept out) which being all included in one parentesis, it is more than a slip thus to mistake it.

And whereas he chargeth me, as if I grounded the law upon no better foundation than a good intent, the reader may easily judge that it is a meere slander: For I lay down the order of the law to be, that such should not be 472received into our fellowship who are likely to disturbe the same; and thence I inferre that this intent is lawfull and good.

The like cast he hath at the persuasion and conscience of such as are to execute this law: And here I must make bold to aske him this question, viz. Seeing you are bound by your oath in all causes wherein you are to give your vote for elections, etc. to goe according to your conscience, if then one be propounded to be chosen a magistrate, and you are persuaded in your conscience, by the best knowledge you can get of him, that he is not fitt for that place, whether are you to give your vote for him or not? When you have answered this question, I will replye further to you: And with all I desyre the answerer to take this along with him; that this law concerning the freemens oath, whereunto all the godly of this common-wealth consented, (and which referrs the judgment of persons and churches in that cause to the conscience and persuasion of Christian men) was never yet held to be a vast and illimitted rule.

The Answerer proceeds to the objections, and least his arguments should not reach his ayme, he speakes to prejudice the readers judgment, by averring much unsoundnes, etc. beforehand, but I must intreate him to make a better discovery ere it be yeelded.

The 1st objection is, that some profane persons are received and others who are religious are rejected.

The answerer disclaymes this objection as none of theirs, which matters not greatly. I know from whome I heard it, though he did not; yet he might as well owne it, as offer to prove that such as are truly and christianly religious have been rejected, except he will denye such to be religious: But I affirme still, as I did before, that I know of none such, who have been rejected, nor any such blasphemers or quarrellers (as he speakes of) to have been received.

In his answer to my solution of this objection, I only observe this, that whereas my argument is by way of comparison “betweene a younge prophaine person and an elder professor confirmed in some errour,” he gainesaith the comparison by introduction of Abraham, who was a blessing to others; but alledgeth not any opposite member; but sure he was in a greate streight, otherwise he would not have held forth the father of the faithfull as such an one, as he must produce to answer my comparison; but it well accords with his owne tenent, that he must have leave to advance his owne partie, whatever danger or damage befall others by it.

After this he takes upon him to prove, “that all such as are confirmed in any way of errour, are not to be denyed cohabitation, but are to be pittyed 473and reformed, for this he alledgeth two places of scripture, Jude 22, 23. Gen. 16. 17.”

To this I replye 1st, Let it be observed how this answers my argument. I endeavoured to prove that some professors were to be denyed cohabitation, rather than some prophaine ones, for this reason, viz. because they may be more dangerous. His answer is, that all such as are confirmed in any way of errour are not to be denyed, etc. and omitts that wherein the weight of the argument lies, viz. their being dangerous to publick peace. 2dly, I denye that these scriptures prove his proposition, for that in Jude speakes nothinge of cohabitation, or confirmation in errour, nor speakes he to magistrates, or such as had power, to receive or reject, etc. and if he will bring that place to his purpose it will inferre this conclusion, that no compassion is to be had of such as we may denye cohabitation unto. As for that, Gen. 16. 12. it is as little to the purpose. Ismaell dwelt in the house of his brethren, but not among them; so, by our law, such as we hold not fitt to dwell among us are not denyed to dwell by us.

Another objection is, “that by this law we reject true Christians, and so consequently Christ himselfe.”

The solution of this objection is, that in some cases a man that is a true Christian may be rejected or denyed residence, and yet Christ not rejected; for proof whereof I instance in diverse particulars, all which he passeth by, without any direct answer; but concludes, that is nothing to the law; which I must leave to the reader to judge of, seeing he brings neither reason nor scripture against it, to which I may replye.

After this he comes to the particular occasion of the law, and here he layes about him in earnest, and strikes all that come in his way, magistrates, elders, and all that doe walk in that way which Mr. Wheelewright hath described to be a way of a covenant of workes, and holds them forth as Antichrists; and for proof hereof alledges that in 1 John 4. 1, 2, 3. where the Apostle, giving a rule to discover false spirits by, gives this as the marke, they confesse not that Jesus Christ came in the flesh, and such a spirit is of Antichrist. How this place proves his assertion I am not able to discerne: Sure I am that such, as he casts under a covenant of workes, doe confesse that Christ is come in the flesh, but then I see that hereby he hath brought the cause, which he is so zealous for, into such a toyle as all the skill he hath cannot extricate, unlesse (as before) he will draw in Abraham into the same estate of antichristianism; seeing by that doctrine he walked in the same way of a covenant of workes, 14 yeares together, viz. while he kept Hagar, etc.

For his answer in defence of Mr. Wheelewright his opinions, I will make no 474replye, but waite the successe of the conference among the churches now assembled.

In the last place he bringeth diverse reasons to prove “that this law is most wicked and sinnefull.”

His 1st reason is, this law giveth that, without limitation, to men, which is proper to God; and so is a ground of grosse popery; for proofe he cites Deut. 1. 17. and 17. 9, 10, 11.

To which I answer, that I have proved already that the magistrates are limitted both by their church covenant and by their oath, and by the dutye of theire places, to square all their proceedings by the rule of Gods word, for the advancement of the gospell and the weale publick; neither doth it crosse either of the places mentioned, for whatsoever sentence the magistrate gives, according to these limittations, the judgment is the Lords, though he do it not by any rule particularly prescribed by civill authority. As for that other place in Deut. 17. 9. it strengthens our law, and reflects sharply upon such as doe oppose it; for it streightly commands all persons to submitt to the sentence of the judge, and to receive the exposition of the law from his mouth; so as such gainesayers stand guilty of presumption in opposeing the sentence of the judges, before they have clearely convinced them that their sentence is contrary to the law of God.

As for that aspersion of popery, etc. it will draw no blood; his earnestnes in the cause makes him thus to cast dirt upon his opposers, when he hath spent his shott.

2. His 2d reason against this law is, that it gives libertye to the magistrates to expell and reject those who are most eminent Christians, if they suite not with the magistrates disposition; and thence concludes that Christ and his members will finde worse entertainment among us than the Israelites did among the Egyptians and Babilonians, than Abraham and Isaack among the Philistines, than Lott among the Sodomites, etc.

To this I answer, 1. His earnestnes confounds his memorye; he knows well, that this law gives no power to expell any, neither doth it make the magistrates disposition the rule for rejecting any; but this slander hath beene confuted before. 2. For a brother in church covenant and a fellow member of such a civill body as ours, to conclude so peremptorily of his fellow brethren, favours of much arogance and desperate prejudice. If his charity can hope no better of us, but that we will deale worse with Gods people than the Pagans (and that before he hath seene any experience of it) it is no marvaile if he favour such as have ranked us with the same before; onely herein he 475deales fairely with us, in giving us tymely warneing what to expect from the imbittered mynde of such a brother; but for his argument it selfe thus it stands: The Egyptians, etc. gave leave to Gods people, to sett downe amongst them; But the magistrates will not give leave, etc. ergo, they are worse than the Egyptians, etc.

I answer, howsoever the magistrates cannot stopp his fury, yet we shall free the law from the force of his argument: For except he had assumed thus, the magistrates must or may etc. for it is nothing to the law, that they will doe so, seeing a magistrates will may transgresse a good law, and if they should doe so, yet I denye that it is by the liberty of the law, which I shall not need further to prove, seeing my denyall will bear as much weight as his affirmation.

3. His 3d reason is, this law doth crosse many lawes of Christ. This he proves by enumeration of 3 particulars, Matt. 22. 21. Heb. 13. 2. Gal. 6. 10.

To this I answer, and 1. to that of Matt. 22. 21. Give unto Cesar the things which are Cesars. The reason lyes thus: The King hath right to plant any of his subjects among us; but we denye to let him plant some of his subjects among us, unlesse they please us; ergo, we denye to Cesar, etc. The proposition is false; for I have proved before, that the King haveing given all the land within certaine limitts to the patentees and their associates, cannot send others to possesse that which he hath granted before.

2. As for that in Heb. 13. it is nothing to the purpose: This law of the court hinders not the entertainment of straingers so farre as the rule of hospitalitye requires; and there is no other intended in that place.

3. For that in Gal. 6. I confesse the houshold of faith are principally to be regarded; and it is apparent that the care of their wellfare was the only occasion and ground (next the glory of God) of the making of this law: For, the court, taking nottice how the hearts of the faithfull were sadded by the spreading of diverse new and unsound opinions, and the uncharitable censures which they laye under by occasion of them, how brotherly love and communion decayed, how the ordinances of religion were neglected, and the faithfull dispensers thereof (sometimes more precious than fine gold) slighted and reproached, throughout the whole countrey, they found it needfull to provide remedye in tyme, that it might goe well with the houshold of faith, and though the execution of this law should turne to the damage of some of this houshold, yet better it is some member should suffer the evill they bring upon themselves, than that, by indulgence towards them, the whole familye of God in this countrey should be scattered, if not destroyed.

His last argument (by which we may see that he ment not to quitt the cause, so long as his breath would hold) is this, This law dasheth against many other lawes of Christ ergo, it is more wicked and sinnefull.

To which my answer may be short, and yet sufficient to withstand the force of his argument. This law dasheth not against any law of Christ; ergo, it is just and good.