In my Letter of Yesterday, I think it was demonstrated that the English Constitution is a Republic, and that the Regal Negative upon the Laws, is essential to that Republic: because that without it, that Government would not be what it is a monarchical Republic, and consequently could not preserve the Ballance of Power between, the Executive and Legislative Powers, nor that other Ballance, which is in the Legislative between the one, the few and the many, in which two Ballances the Excellence of that form of Government, consists.

Let Us now enquire, whether the new Constitution of the United States is, or is not a monarchical Republic, like that of G. Britain.— The Monarchical, and the Aristocratical Power, in our Constitution, it is true are not hereditary: but this makes no difference in the nature of the Power, in the nature of the Ballance, or in the name of the Species of Government.— it would make no difference in the Power of a Judge, or Justice, or General, or Admiral, whether his Commission were for Life or Years. his authority, during the time it lasted would be the Same, whether it were for one Year or twenty, or for Life, or descendible to his eldest son.— The People The Nation, in whom all Power resides originally, may delegate their Power, for one Year, or for ten Years, for Years or for Life, or may delegate it in fee simple, or fee Tail, if I may so express my self or during good behaviour, or at Will, or till further orders. A nation might unanimously create a Dictator or Despot, for one Year, or more, or for Life, or for Perpetuity with hereditary descent. in Such a Case, the Dictator for one Year, would as really be a Dictator during the Time, his Power lasted, as the other would be whose Power was perpetual and descendible.— a Nation in the Same manner might create a Simple Monarch, for Years, Life or Perpetuity, and in either Case the Creature would be equally a Simple Monarch during the Continuance of his Power. so the People of England might create King, Lords and commons, for a Year, or for several Years, or for Life—and in any of these Cases, their Government would be a monarchical Republic, or if you will a limited Monarchy, during its continuance, as much as it is now, when the King and Nobles are hereditary. They might make their house of commons hereditary too. what the Consequence of this would be it is easy to foresee: but it would not 82 in the first moment make any change in the legal Power, nor in the name of the Government.

Let Us now consider what our Constitution is: and see whether any other name can with propriety be given it: than that of a monarchical Republic, or if you will a limited Monarchy.— The Duration of our President is neither perpetual nor for Life, it is only for four Years: but his Power, during those four Years, is much greater than that of an Avoyer, a Consul a Podesta, a Doge, a Statholder, nay than a King of Poland.— nay than a King of Sparta.— I know of no first Magistrate, in any Republican Government, excepting England and Neuchattel, who possesses a constitutional Dignity, Authority and Power comparable to his.— The Power of Sending and receiving Ambassadors of raising and commanding Armies and Navies, of nominating appointing and commissioning all Offices—of managing the Treasures, the internal and external affairs of the nation—nay the whole Executive Power, co extensive with the Legislative Power is vested in him: and he has the Right and his is the Duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.— These Rights and Duties, these Prerogatives and Dignities, are so transcendant, that they must naturally and necessarily excite in the Nation all the Jealousy, Envy, Fears, Apprehensions and Opposition, that is so constantly observed in England against the Crown.

That these Powers are necessary I readily Admit. That the Laws cannot be executed without them: that the Lives, Liberties, Properties and Characters of the Citizens cannot be Secure, without their Protection is most clear. But it is equally certain I think that they ought to have been Still greater, or much less.— The Limitations upon them, in the Cases of War, Treaties, and Appointments to Office and especially the Limitation, on the Presidents Independence as a branch of the Legislature, will be the destruction of this Constitution, and involve us in Anarchy, if not amended.— I shall pass over all these particulars for the present, except the last: because that is now the Point in dispute between You and me.

Longitude and the Philosophers Stone, have not been sought with more Earnestness by Philosophers, than a Guardian of the Laws has been Studied by Legislators from Plato to Montesquieu. but every Project has been found to be no better, than committing the Lamb to the Custody of the Wolf, excepting that one, which is called A ballance of Power.— a Simple Sovereignty, in one, a few, or many has no ballance, and therefore no Laws. a divided Sovereignty without a ballance, or in other Words, where the division is unequal is always 83 at War, and consequently has no Laws. in our Constitution the Sovereignty, i.e the Legislative Power is divided, into three Branches. The House and Senate are equal, but the third Branch, tho essential is not equal.— The President must pass Judgment upon every Law—but in Some Cases his Judgment may be overruled. These Cases will be Such as attack, his constitutional Power, it is therefore certain he has not equal Power to defend himself, or the Constitution or the Judicial Power, as the Senate and House have.

Power naturally grows.— Why? because human Passions are insatiable. but that Power alone can grow which is already too great, that which is unchecked. that which has no equal Power to controul it. The Legislative Power in our Constitution, is greater than the Executive, it will therefore encroach—because both Aristocratical and democratical Passions are insatiable.— The Legislative Power will increase, the Executive will diminish.— in the Legislature, the Monarchical Power is not equal, either to the Aristocratical, or democratical—it will therefore decrease, while the others will increase. indeed I think the Aristocratical Power is greater than either the Monarchical or Democratical. that will therefore Swallow up the other two.

in my Letter of Yesterday, I think it was proved, that a Republic might make the Supream Executive an integral Part of the Legislature. in this it is equally demonstrated as I think, that our Constitution ought to be amended, by a decisive Adoption of that Expedient.

if you dont forbid me, I shall write you again, / Yours sincerely

It was a very singular pleasure to me to receive a Line from you approving the discourse which I did myself the honor to send to you; the good opinion of such a Gentleman as Mr Adams & the very great honor wch he has done me will not easily be effaced from my remembrance.

Not till this Week have I met with the political annals of George Chalmers printed in London 1780 in one Vol 4to. 1 From what little I have as yet had Opportunity to read of the work, I conceive the 84 author to have the spirit of indefatigable enquiry which is necessary in a historian, tho’ I think not so much of that Candor which is becoming in judging the characters & actions of those who have trod the Stage before us— The reason of my mentioning him to you is to introduce an enquiry whether you know the Man—Whether he be an American refugee or an Englishman—a Lawyer I think he is—& whether there is or is likely to be a second volume of his work. When I observe his having had access to the papers in the plantation Office, I feel a regret that an Ocean seperates me from such a grand repository. how necessary to form a just judgment of the secret springs of many American transactions!

The want of public repositories for historical materials as well as the destruction of many valuable ones by fires, by war & by the lapse of time has long been a subject of regret in my mind. Many papers which are daily thrown away may in future be much wanted, but except here & there a person who has a curiosity of his own to gratify no one cares to undertake the Collection & of this class of Collectors there are scarcely any who take Care for securing what they have got together after they have quitted the Stage. The only sure way of preserving such things is by printing them in some voluminous work as the Remembrancer—but the attempt to carry on such a work would probably not meet with encouragement— the publication of Govr Winthrop’s journal labours & I fear will come to nought.—2

You have done what I wished in publishing the Letters to Dr Calkoen, a Copy of which I was favoured with the Sight of by Mr Cranch before this publication was made. It is certainly an important point in the History of our Revolution that it was the work of the people at large & not of any party or faction as our Enemies have affected to believe. There is another point which ought to be as fully ascertained & that is that our Opposition to Great Brittain did not originate in a desire of Independence, but that we preserved our loyalty & affection to the Crown of Great Brittain as long as was practicable considering the immense provocation which we received.

Pray my dear Sir is it a fact that Baron Kalb was sent over hither by the Court of France to sound the inclinations of the Americans after the Repeal of the Stamp-act & that he found us so passionately attached to the British nation as to report the impossibility of attempting a seperation?3

You will pardon me for thus intruding on your more important engagements—& if you think me too forward or impertinent in my 85 enquiries, suggest to me the propriety of being less so & you shall be obeyed—for really Sir I have a regard for your Character little short of veneration.—

Believe me therefore yr truly respectful / & much obliged friend & humble Ser[vant]