I received your letter of the 20th Inst. I had in mine of the Same date communicated to you my Ideas on that part of the constitution, limiting the Presidents power of negativing the acts of the legislature.— And just hinted some thoughts on the propriety, of the provision made for the appointment to offices, which I esteem to be a power nearly as important as legislation.

If that was vested in the President alone, he might were it not for his periodical election by the people—render himself despotic.— It was a Saying of one of the Kings of England. That while the King could appoint the Bishops and judges he might have what Religion and Law he pleased.

It appears to me the Senate is the most important branch in the government, for aiding & Supporting the Executive, Securing the rights of the individual States, the government of the united States, and the liberties of the people, The Executive Magistrate is to execute the laws, the Senate being a branch of the legislature will 115 naturally incline to have them duly executed, and therefore will advise to Such appointments as will best attain that end.— from the knowledge of the people in the Several States, they can give the best information who are qualified for offices, and though they will as you justly observe in Some degree lessen his responsibility, yet their advice may enable him to make Such judicious appointments as to render responsibility less necessary—

The Senators being elegible by the legislatures of the Several States, and dependent on them for reelection will be vigilant in supporting their rights against infringement by the legislature or executive of the united States.— And the government of the union being federal, and Instituted by the several States for the advancement of their Interests, they may be considered as So many pillars to Support it. and by the exercise of the State governments, peace and good order may be preserved in places most remote from the Seat of the Federal government, as well as at the centre. And the Municipal and federal rights of the people at large will be regarded by the Senate, they being elected by the immediate representatives of the people, & their rights will be best Secured by a due execution of the laws.— what temptation can the Senate be under to partiality in the trial, of officers whom they had a voice in the appointment of, can they be disposed to favour a person who has violated his trust & their confidence? The other evils that you mention that may result from this power appear to me, but barely possible. The Senators will doubtless be in general Some of the most respectable citizens in the States for wisdom & probity, superiour to mean and unworthy conduct—and instead of undue influence to procure appointments for themselves or their friends, they will consider that a fair and upright conduct will have the best tendency to preserve the confidence of the people & of the States. They will be disposed to be diffident in recommending their friends & kindred, lest they Should be Suspected of partiality, and the other Members will feel the same kind of reluctance lest they Should be thought unduly to favour a person because related to a member of their body.— So that their friends and relations would not Stand so good a chance for appointment to offices according to their merit as others.

The Senate is a convenient body to advise the President from the Smalness of its numbers. And I think the laws would be better framed & more duly administred if the Executive and judiciary officers were in general members of the legislature, in case there Should be no interference as to the time of attending to their 116 Several duties— this I have learned by experience in the government in which I live, & by observation of others differently constituted.

I See no principles in our constitution that have any tendency to Aristocracy, which if I understand the term, is, a government by Nobles independent of the people, which cant take place in either respect without a total Subversion of the Constitution. and as both branches of Congress are elegible from the Citizens at large & wealth is not a requisite qualification, both will commonly be composed of members of Similar Circumstances in Life. And I See no reason why the Several brancheses of the government Should not maintain the most perfect harmony, their powers being all directed to one end the advancement of the public good.

If the President alone was vested with the power of appointing all officers, and was left to Select a council for himself he would be liable to be deceived by flatterers and pretenders to Patriotism, who would have no motive but their own emolument, they would wish to extend the powers of the Executive to encrease their own importance, and however upright he might be in his intentions, there would be great danger of his being misled, even to the Subversion of the constitution, or at least to introduce such evils as to interrup the harmony of the government & deprive him of the confidence of the people. but I have Said enough upon these Speculative points, which nothing but experience can reduce to a certainty.

I have the honor to be / with great Esteem & Respect / Your obedient / humble Servant

Our Citizens here disapprobate the Compensations, as they are called, which have passed the lower House of Congress. They generally think that the Salary of the Vice President should have been Ten thousand Dollars, A Guinea Per Diem for the Representatives, & six Dollars for a Senator. As it now stands, the first Sum is a Disgrace to the Government; & is here considered as arising from Party Views & illiberal Policy.1

The Constitution intended a Distinction in the Rank & Dignity of the Senate as being the Upper House of Congress, & that Difference, ought to be extended to Pay as well as to Place.

Our Profession are waiting with some Impatience for the Judicial Appointments. Mr. Dana & Mr. Lowell are supposed to be the Candidates for the Supreme Bench. Neither I believe (indeed the latter I know)2 would not, accept the District. A certain Probate Judge is supposed to have taken great Pains to obtain this Post.3 To no Person but to Yourself, unless my Letter to the President should be quoted against the assertion, have I ever hinted a Wish to be noticed in the Places that must soon be disposed of. But you will now give me leave to say that I should be pleased with an appointment to some Office (the Advocateship is now out of the Question) which my Education might enable me to discharge the Duties of. I am now advancing to forty, & as the Profession is at present circumstanced, the Spirits & Feelings are too often affronted, for a Gentleman not to wish a Removal from the Drudgery of earning, & the Mortification of asking for fees, which are now become paltry. More than this, on such a Subject, I ought not to say even to you, Sir. And less, at this Juncture, I might perhaps hereafter regret, to have communicated.

I am, Dr Sir, / yours