I had often considered your Situation, before the Receipt of your Letter of the 16th, and I had hoped you would “Possess yourself in Patience.” If you already draw a Picture Teste di legno and talk of sharpening an Ax for Decapitation, what am I to look for in the Run of a Twelvemonth?

I do not like your diminutive italien Idea. You who are said to be more than half british ought to have called yourself a spare Rudder or Mainmast; and that would have given me a fine oppertunity to comment upon the Parsimony of those who will not pay for a good one when the Length and Risk of an Enterprise demand such a 113 precautionary Duplicate. Once more however I recur to the Tëte-debois—tis a delphic one you must own; and you are to expect the dilectable Chance of being applied to in all Cases of Difficulty; I do not mean when the Judgement of the Senate is in Reality at Moieties, For, that will not be the Event one Time in Fifty, while 49 Times relative Contingencies of Popularity will balance the Votes and your oracular Decision will have the Praise or Blame. “You have decided in Favour of the Power of the Prime because you look up to that Goal.” If I did not know you well I would not write thus to you. A weak Man only would be discouraged by such Suggestions of the Base. All whom you esteem here are pleased with your Vote. But better than that, I know you have your own Approbation upon your own Principles which lead regularly to impavidum ferient ruinæ.1

I feel at this Period redoubled mortifications that you was not at Home when I dined with your Lady and conversed with Doctr. Tufts upon the Point of Time when the continental Government was to affect our Laws of Revenue. He conceded to my Idea that we could not be deranged ’till the compleat Organization of Congress, when I expected a Proclamation from the President directing the Continuence of the offices & officers of the Confederation till further orders, and providing against any Derangements in the individual States, where the new Constitution might be naturally supposed to interfere—till the legislative measures of Congress should be in Operation.—

I have 8 or 9 Causes of Libels to be tried this Week some of them as high as twelve hundred pounds; and I am told most of the Bar are engaged together for mutual Assistance to defend upon the principle that no Impost Law has been in Force here since ——— I know not when.

“Congress” are to have such and such Powers—“and to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”2

If these Seizures of mine are acquitted all the Duties I have collected in the Period, be it what it may, are to be refunded.— It was upon that Paragraph of the VIIIth Section, that I fixed for the Termination of my State Collection of Impost. what say the Merchants of N york or Philada. respecting State Duties? Is it only here that Doubts exist? I can give only one of two Reasons why a Proclamation did not appear. The Idea at Head Quarters must have been either that Nobody could suppose we had a Right here to Impost or 114 that nobody could doubt but that we had it— yet, in Fact, there is a great Division of Sentiment upon the Point.

I have directed the Attorney General to go forward by Demurrer or Appeal. And I had advised the supreme Judges to converse upon the Subject as they were riding the Eastern Circuit or smoaking their Evening Pipes together.

Have we now the Right of Tender? In my opinion the Constitution decides that without the necessity of any Law of Congress. Can a Pyrate be now tried? our Law is sufficient till congress promulge one. This last Principle avails in the Impost. Excuse my Impertinence in showing my Opinion, while I meant to intreat yours.

I salute You and your Lady and Family cordially. Pardon the Slovenlyness, I have detained the Postmaster already too long from his Office

Your devoted Friend

I received your letter of the 20th Inst. I had in mine of the Same date communicated to you my Ideas on that part of the constitution, limiting the Presidents power of negativing the acts of the legislature.— And just hinted some thoughts on the propriety, of the provision made for the appointment to offices, which I esteem to be a power nearly as important as legislation.

If that was vested in the President alone, he might were it not for his periodical election by the people—render himself despotic.— It was a Saying of one of the Kings of England. That while the King could appoint the Bishops and judges he might have what Religion and Law he pleased.

It appears to me the Senate is the most important branch in the government, for aiding & Supporting the Executive, Securing the rights of the individual States, the government of the united States, and the liberties of the people, The Executive Magistrate is to execute the laws, the Senate being a branch of the legislature will 115 naturally incline to have them duly executed, and therefore will advise to Such appointments as will best attain that end.— from the knowledge of the people in the Several States, they can give the best information who are qualified for offices, and though they will as you justly observe in Some degree lessen his responsibility, yet their advice may enable him to make Such judicious appointments as to render responsibility less necessary—

The Senators being elegible by the legislatures of the Several States, and dependent on them for reelection will be vigilant in supporting their rights against infringement by the legislature or executive of the united States.— And the government of the union being federal, and Instituted by the several States for the advancement of their Interests, they may be considered as So many pillars to Support it. and by the exercise of the State governments, peace and good order may be preserved in places most remote from the Seat of the Federal government, as well as at the centre. And the Municipal and federal rights of the people at large will be regarded by the Senate, they being elected by the immediate representatives of the people, & their rights will be best Secured by a due execution of the laws.— what temptation can the Senate be under to partiality in the trial, of officers whom they had a voice in the appointment of, can they be disposed to favour a person who has violated his trust & their confidence? The other evils that you mention that may result from this power appear to me, but barely possible. The Senators will doubtless be in general Some of the most respectable citizens in the States for wisdom & probity, superiour to mean and unworthy conduct—and instead of undue influence to procure appointments for themselves or their friends, they will consider that a fair and upright conduct will have the best tendency to preserve the confidence of the people & of the States. They will be disposed to be diffident in recommending their friends & kindred, lest they Should be Suspected of partiality, and the other Members will feel the same kind of reluctance lest they Should be thought unduly to favour a person because related to a member of their body.— So that their friends and relations would not Stand so good a chance for appointment to offices according to their merit as others.

The Senate is a convenient body to advise the President from the Smalness of its numbers. And I think the laws would be better framed & more duly administred if the Executive and judiciary officers were in general members of the legislature, in case there Should be no interference as to the time of attending to their 116 Several duties— this I have learned by experience in the government in which I live, & by observation of others differently constituted.

I See no principles in our constitution that have any tendency to Aristocracy, which if I understand the term, is, a government by Nobles independent of the people, which cant take place in either respect without a total Subversion of the Constitution. and as both branches of Congress are elegible from the Citizens at large & wealth is not a requisite qualification, both will commonly be composed of members of Similar Circumstances in Life. And I See no reason why the Several brancheses of the government Should not maintain the most perfect harmony, their powers being all directed to one end the advancement of the public good.

If the President alone was vested with the power of appointing all officers, and was left to Select a council for himself he would be liable to be deceived by flatterers and pretenders to Patriotism, who would have no motive but their own emolument, they would wish to extend the powers of the Executive to encrease their own importance, and however upright he might be in his intentions, there would be great danger of his being misled, even to the Subversion of the constitution, or at least to introduce such evils as to interrup the harmony of the government & deprive him of the confidence of the people. but I have Said enough upon these Speculative points, which nothing but experience can reduce to a certainty.

I have the honor to be / with great Esteem & Respect / Your obedient / humble Servant