Papers of John Adams, volume 18

To John Adams from Tristram Dalton, 11 July 1786 Dalton, Tristram Adams, John
From Tristram Dalton
Dear Sir Boston July: 11th: 1786

This morning has honored me with your most esteemed favors1 of the 26th May—for which be pleased to accept my sincere thank[s—]

All on this side of the Atlantic, who speak of the affairs of these United States, joyn in the Opinion you express, “that they must soon take a turn for the better or become much worse—[]

Most of our Citizens appear too unconcerned, falsely supposing that they now sit, in safety, under their own vines—and that there are none to make them afraid— No People ever had a fairer opportunity to be what they have anxiously wished to be— None ever neglected their interests more— Jealousy—Pride & Luxury—an unbounded Thirst for baneful Commerce—want of attention to the internal resources of their Country—an insensibility of our truly independent Situation—with a great disregard to the importance of establishing a fair national Character—seems to pervade the Continent— From the seeds of division among us, much is to be dreaded— The popular disposition to reduce the payment of our domestic 387 Debt to nothing is a fruitful Subject for those, who wish us ill, to work upon—while Men of Honor and Friends to their Country execrate the Idea of such public Injustice— You presume that the Impost of 5 per Cent is granted to Congress— considering that our political Salvation so much depended upon it, there was the utmost reason to expect it— This Commonwealth has freely granted it agreeably to the requisitions made by Congress— all the States have passed grants thereof, but some with one restriction & some with others, that prevent its operation— New York is the farthest from their duty—even to an Absurdity for that State—well known for regarding their own particular interest— Congress have rejected their Bill that lately passed— This Commonwealth has, in the late session of their General Court, granted to Congress the supplementary Aid required by them— We anxiously wait the Completion of these measures—the consequence of neglecting which Congress has pointed out very fully, in their resolves of the past year2

The G Court of this State, in their late session, which ended on Saturday Evening being adjourned to the 31st of Jany. discarded, by a great majority, a proposal to emit a paper currency—and another for making real & personal Estate a tender in payment of Debts—3

A bill passed, to suspend totally the Navigation Act untill the other States adopt similar measures— This Act was a favorite one of mine—and the suspension of it, altho’ the few neighbouring States who had passed like laws had repealed theirs, gives me much uneasiness— I even fancied good effects began to flow from it— our large Vessells, lain by for a long time, were hired & hiring to freight Timber and other bulky articles to Ireland &c. our smaller ones enjoyed, uninterrupted, a snug business— Our importations from G Britain greatly lessened, and our trade become more safe, if not more extensive— indeed I had formed an idea that the Government was, in fact, bettered by this restraint—and that the continuance of it might be a considerable mean of saving us from ourselves— Now the door is again open’d for British Factors—British GewGaws British Manners & Customs—of all which our fellow Citizens are too fond—& from which, I thought, we were, in some degree, weaned— My Sentiments on this head are unpopular— The Country people are lead into a belief that their produce will fetch more money—and that Silver will be plenty in our Streets— May they not see the contrary— it may be expected that our importations, which began to be moderate, will encrease—and that the little remaining specie among us will 388 be drained in payment for necessaries that we could furnish ourselves with—or for trifles that a people, situated as we are, are better without—

From the Treaty of Peace being laid before the General Court I have, uniformly, opposed the Measures taken to prevent the admission of Tories—and the last year had the Success, in the House of Representatives, to obtain a bill repealing these obnoxious Laws— This was stopped at the Senate— tired with my endeavours, I have not called up the bill in the late session—but have charged myself to do it the beginning of the next— I do not know of any law to prevent the recovery, in our Courts, of British Debts— The interest due upon those recovered is to be calculated and entered on record—and, if a negotiation of this article between the Courts of the U States & of G Britain, which was expected, should determine the payment thereof, an execution may be taken out to the amount without a new trial—

That the British Merchants should be cautious of such as are connected with America may be a point of prudence—but it is unreasonable to stamp a Nation’s Character with infamy because a few, otherwise unnoticed, persons have been imprudently credited to large amounts— Any American who shewed his face in England immediately after the peace took place, and asked for goods, was entrusted— As might have been expected, most of them failed, and brought ruin on their Creditors— what is this to a nation?— To speak confidentially my opinion, this Nation must be in a much worse condition than even her enemies wish her, whenever her Character depends upon the conduct, of, not only a few paltry traders, but, even the whole commercial Line— Great & valuable I esteem this part of the community—but by no means the most considerable. Among many respected Characters who differ from me in the Act against the Tories—and in the Navigation Act, I am sorry to find our Friends—Tufts and Cranch, of the Senate— Even their Authority does not induce me to alter my opinion— I confess it ought to create a diffidence—

Pardon my detaining you so long on Subjects that you are infinitely better informed of—and be pleased to accept of my sincerest wishes for success in your public negotiations—and for happiness in your private life—for with the highest regards, I am, / Dear Sir— / Your obliged Friend / And most hble Servant

Tristram Dalton
389

RC (Adams Papers); internal address: “His Excellency John Adams”; endorsed: “Mr Dalton / July 11. 1786”; and by WSS: “Boston.” Some loss of text due to wear at the edge.

1.

Presumably an inadvertence. Only one 26 May letter from JA to Dalton, above, has been found.

2.

In March the Mass. General Court approved payment of Congress’ 27 Sept. 1785 requisition for the current year, for which see Stephen Higginson’s 30 Dec. letter, and note 6, above. On 5 July 1786 the General Court approved “An Act for Granting to the United States, a Tax upon the Polls and Estates within this Commonwealth, to Operate as a Supplementary Fund to the Continental Impost” (Mass., Acts and Laws , 1786–1787, p. 37–53). The act responded to Congress’ resolution of 18 April 1783 regarding the payment of the national debt, of which Massachusetts’ share was $224,427 ( JCC , 24:258–259), but it also contributed to the grievances of the Shaysite protesters over the burden of taxation, for which see note 3.

3.

On 8 July 1786 the Mass. General Court adjourned until 31 Jan. 1787, although it was called back into session on 27 Sept. 1786 to deal with the disorders cumulatively known as Shays’ Rebellion. The session thus completed was notable for the General Court’s failure to act on the grievances presented to it, most notably by the western counties of Massachusetts where the rebellion was centered. Indeed, if there was a catalyst for the rebellion it was the General Court’s adjournment. This letter from Dalton, merchant and former speaker of the Mass. house of representatives, is therefore of particular interest, because the views he expresses are almost precisely those that the Shaysites were protesting against.

Dalton applauds the General Court’s defeat of legislation to issue paper money and make real and personal property legal tender. But the protesters saw those two measures, in addition to the reform of the judicial system, as panaceas, for it was the lack of resources to pay either taxes or private debts and the use of the court system to coerce the indigent that placed so many western farmers in dire straits (Boston Independent Chronicle, 6, 13 July, 14 Sept.; Richards, Shays’s Rebellion , p. 8–9).

For the progress of the rebellion, from the first convention in Bristol County, and the commonwealth’s initial response, see letters from Charles Storer of 19 Aug., 16 and 26 Sept.; Richard Cranch of 3 Oct.; and James Warren of 22 Oct., all below. Cranch’s letter is noteworthy, for although his and Dalton’s attitudes toward the protesters are much the same, Cranch provides a more detailed account of the issues underlying the rebellion, probably because by the time he wrote, the uprising had become critical. For a discussion of the legitimacy of calling the 1786–1787 Massachusetts insurrection “Shays’ Rebellion,” see Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution , p. 156–157, and Samuel Osgood’s 14 Nov. letter, and note 3, below.

To John Adams from Thomas Jefferson, 11 July 1786 Jefferson, Thomas Adams, John
From Thomas Jefferson
Dear Sir Paris July 11. 1786.

Our instructions relative to the Barbary states having required us to proceed by way of negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our duty to do this to the best of our power. whatever might be our private opinions, they were to be suppressed, and the line marked out to us, was to be followed. it has been so honestly, & zealously. it was therefore never material for us to consult together on the best plan of conduct towards these states. I acknolege I very early thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium of war. tho’ it is a question with which we have nothing to do, yet as you 390 propose some discussion of it I shall trouble you with my reasons. of the 4. positions laid down in your letter of the 3d. instant, I agree to the three first, which are in substance that the good offices of our friends cannot procure us a peace without paying it’s price, that they cannot materially lessen that price, & that paying it, we can have the peace in spight of the intrigues of our enemies. as to the 4th. that the longer the negotiation is delayed the larger will be the demand, this will depend on the intermediate captures: if they are many & rich the price may be raised; if few & poor it will be lessened. however if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be hastened. but I should prefer the obtaining it by war. 1. justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. honor favors it. 3. it will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a safe-guard to interest. 4. it will arm the federal head with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over their delinquent members, & prevent them from using what would be less safe. I think that so far you go with me. but in the next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. equally effectual. I ask a fleet of 150. guns, the one half of which shall be in constant cruise. this fleet built, manned & victualled for 6. months will cost 450,000£ sterling. it’s annual expence is 300£ sterl. a gun, including every thing: this will be 45,000£ sterl. a year. I take British experience for the basis of my calculations, tho’ we know, from our own experience, that we can do, in this way, for pounds lawful, what costs them pounds sterling. were we to charge all this to the Algerine war it would amount to little more than we must pay if we buy peace. but as it is proper & necessary that we should establish a small marine force (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines,) and as that force laid up in our dockyards would cost us half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say that only 22,500£ sterl. per ann. should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. it will be as effectuel. to all the mismanagements of Spain & Portugal urged to shew that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary where there is any management. about 40. year ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent Monsr. de Massac with one large & two small frigates, he blockaded the harbour of Algiers three months, & they subscribed to the terms he dictated.1 if it be admitted however that war, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to incertainties, I weigh against this the greater incertainty of the 391 duration of a peace bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey 80. years old, & by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea to enforce an observance of it.

So far I have gone on the supposition that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. but 1. Naples will join us. the character of their naval minister (Acton)2 his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officiously trying to make for them, & his dispositions against the Algerines give the greatest reason to believe it. 2. every principle of reason tells us Portugal will join us. I state this as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not be at peace with Algiers. I suppose then that a Convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples & the U.S. by which the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them according to their respective wealth, and the term of it should be when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. this might be left open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland & Spain if her peace be made) would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of having their peace with the Pyratical states guarantied by the whole. I suppose that in this case our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on.

These are the reasons which have influenced my judgment on this question. I give them to you to shew you that I am imposed on by a semblance of reason at least, & not with an expectation of their changing your opinion. you have viewed the subject, I am sure in all it’s bearings. you have weighed both questions with all their circumstances. you make the result different from what I do. the same facts impress us differently. this is enough to make me suspect an error in my process of reasoning tho’ I am not able to detect it. it is of no consequence; as I have nothing to say in the decision, and am ready to proceed heartily on any other plan which may be adopted, if my agency should be thought useful. with respect to the dispositions of the states I am utterly uninformed. I cannot help thinking however that on a view of all circumstances, they might be united in either of the plans.

Having written this on the receipt of your letter, without knowing of any opportunity of sending it, I know not when it will go: I add nothing therefore on any other subject but assurances of the sincere esteem and respect with which I am Dear Sir your friend & servant

Th: Jefferson
392

RC (Adams Papers); internal address: “H. E. / Mr. Adams”; endorsed: “Mr Jefferson July 11. / Ansd. July 31. 1786”; docketed by JQA: “T. Jefferson 11. July 1786.”

1.

Claude Louis, Marquis de Massiac, served as a French vice admiral and naval minister. For his plan as a captain to blockade Algiers with a ship of the line and two frigates, see Jefferson, Papers , 9:319.

2.

Sir John Francis Edward Acton, 6th Baronet (1736–1811), had led the Neapolitan Navy and served as minister of war since 1779. He achieved his post under Leopold I, Grand Duke of Tuscany, at the behest of the grand duke’s sister Maria Caroline, Queen of Naples. Acton became the de facto Neapolitan prime minister in 1789 but was forced into exile in Sicily by the French in 1806 ( DNB ).