RC (Adams Papers); internal addresses: “John Adams Esquire.” and “His Excellency / John Adams Esquire / Minister Plenipotentiary from / the United States of America / a Hague.”; endorsed: “Mr Laurens— 3. of Feb. / ansd. 11. 1784.”

Henry Laurens Jr. carried his father’s letter to JA and the packet that presumably consisted of Joseph Reed’s letter of 30 Jan. and Elbridge Gerry’s letter of 23 Nov. 1783, which Reed had carried to England to be forwarded to JA (vol. 15:369–376, 472–473). See also JA’s reply to Reed of 11 Feb. 1784, below.

The letters or packets that Laurens sent to John Stockdale to be forwarded to JA have not been identified. JA visited Bath in late Dec. 1783, but he left there for London on the 27th to begin his arduous journey to the Netherlands in order to deal with the crisis that had erupted over the Dutch-American loan and the lack of funds to pay Robert Morris’ bills of exchange (vol. 15:416).

This is Henry Laurens’ final letter to JA, and JA’s reply of 11 Feb. 1784, below, is his last letter to Laurens. It is unclear what “injurios treatment,” beyond the unreturned letters mentioned in the second paragraph, provoked Laurens’ anger. In his reply JA wrote that he was unaware of anything he had done to injure Laurens. One can only speculate that Laurens’ outrage may have stemmed from JA’s assumption of Laurens’ position as minister to the Netherlands while the South Carolinian was jailed in the Tower of London and his refusal to relinquish it upon Laurens’ release; JA’s continued friendship for Edmund Jenings despite Laurens’ bitter and public dispute with Jenings over several anonymous letters; or Laurens’ absence from the 3 Sept. 1783 signing of the definitive treaty, a slight he later blamed on JA, “the malicious contriver” (Laurens, Papers , 15:403). See also Laurens’ account of a conversation he had with JA on 19 Dec. 1782 in which he indicates some dissatisfaction with his colleague, vol. 14:140–142.

RC and enclosures (Adams Papers); internal address: “To his Excellency / John Adams Esqr / Hague.”; endorsed: “Messs Willinks & Co. / 4. Feb. Ansd 5. 1784.”

This letter and its enclosures should be considered with Wilhem & Jan Willink’s 4 Feb. letter and enclosure, which immediately follow. Although couched in the arcane phraseology and calculations of eighteenth-century Dutch finance, these documents present with remarkable clarity the nature of the loan the consortium was pursuing on JA’s behalf. The diminished creditworthiness of the United States in the eyes of Dutch investors is evident from the consortium’s enclosed “Sheme.” In 1782 JA and the consortium had negotiated a 5 million florin loan at 5 percent interest. Two years later a loan of 2 million florins was the maximum possible, and the undertakers were willing to commit only to the first million. Moreover the cost of the loan would be much higher, first because it would ostensibly be offered at 6 percent, but also because extraordinary gratuities or gratifications were needed to induce investment in American securities. This meant that to the original 2 million florins in principal would be added additional loan obligations to the amount of 690,000 florins. These would be distributed to investors by lottery in the years 1785, 1787, 1789, 1791, 1793, 1795, and 1797. Interest would be paid on the principal, including the additional 690,000 florins, from 1784 through 1799. Then, from 9 1800 through 1806, the 2,690,000 florins in principal would be repaid in installments, but an additional gratification would be paid each year, ranging from 5 percent in 1801 to 15 percent in 1806.

The consortium’s letter and its enclosure set down the basic and, from the standpoint of JA and the United States, very harsh terms of the loan that the consortium proposed to negotiate with the undertakers. But appearances were somewhat deceiving, for the loan’s ultimate success as well as the way in which the interest was paid and the principal redeemed made the loan less onerous than it might appear at first glance. This is evident from the Willinks’ letter of 4 Feb. 1784, and its enclosure, wherein they set down the loan’s effective, as opposed to its apparent, cost. As the consortium indicates, and as the Willinks make clear by their calculations, the United States would pay 6 percent interest on the principal. However, the annual cash outlay of the United States to the investors would be 4 percent. The approximately 2 percent that was not being expended would become due when the principal was redeemed between 1800 and 1806. This meant that between 1784 and 1800 the United States would avoid expenditures of approximately 765,636 florins, enough to pay for the additional loan obligations and other expenses. It also had the effect, as the Willinks indicate in their letter, of producing a more favorable interest rate than if the money had actually been borrowed at 6 percent. For the terms of the loan as the negotiations proceeded, see the plan enclosed by Wilhem & Jan Willink with their letter of 4 Feb. 1784, a later plan enclosed by the Willinks with their letter of 16 Feb., as well as the [9 March] contract for the loan as finally concluded, all below.

The “packets” probably included the original and duplicate of C. W. F. Dumas’ 1 Feb. letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs ( Dipl. Corr., 1783–1789 , 3:480–482).

The enclosures comprised two sheets. The first was headed “Sheme of a Loan,” and the second, “Repartition of the Obligations.”