At 8 o’clock on the morning of 3 September 1783, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay met David Hartley at the Hôtel d’York in Paris to sign the Anglo-American definitive peace treaty.1 For Adams, who made no diary entry to record the event, this final act of the American Revolution was anticlimactic. The war was ended and the United States stood sovereign and independent, but the treaty signed that morning was little different from the preliminary articles of the previous November.2 Adams wrote to the president of Congress that “unable to obtain, any addition or Explanation, We have been obliged to agree to sign the Provisional Articles over again with only a Preamble, making them a Definitive Treaty. No Regulation of Commerce is agreed upon, and indeed we have no Commission or Authority to make any.— We have thus lost Seven or eight months of our time.”3

John Adams accurately described the result of the commissioners’ negotiations. He also identified the principal problem that would plague relations between the United States and Britain in the postwar world. That is, neither the preliminary articles nor the definitive treaty established the basis upon which trade between the two nations would be conducted. There was little doubt that Britain would resume its status as the principal trading partner of the United States. But Congress’ 1781 revocation of Adams’ 1779 commission to negotiate an Anglo-American commercial treaty denied the United States any opportunity to conclude such an agreement with the Earl xxof Shelburne’s ministry during the 1782 peace negotiations.4 The commissioners thought it imperative to remedy this situation by including commercial articles in the definitive treaty or by reaching an understanding with Britain that would lay the foundation for later negotiations toward either a commercial treaty or a convention. The Shelburne ministry fell, however, in late February 1783 and was not replaced by the coalition government headed by Charles James Fox and Frederick, Lord North, until early April.5 This meant that talks with David Hartley did not begin until the end of April. Hartley was amenable to resolving the commercial issues in the definitive treaty. But by mid-June the commissioners were convinced that Hartley’s wishes exceeded his powers, and Adams informed Congress that there was “no prospect of agreeing upon any regulation of Commerce.”6

This situation arose because the British attitude toward America fundamentally changed in the aftermath of the Anglo-American preliminary peace. Increasingly Britons of whatever political stripe saw the treaty provisions as overly favorable to the United States. Even before the Shelburne ministry fell in February, in part because of the Anglo-American treaty, support for further concessions was in rapid decline. And by June and July the decisive influence of John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, was being felt. He spoke in Parliament against yielding to the United States on any matters of trade and buttressed his arguments with a pamphlet entitled Observations on the Commerce of the American States with Europe and the West Indies. Sheffield argued persuasively that Britain’s economic survival depended on the preservation and enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and a parliamentary majority shared that view.7 At the same time the decision was made to regulate Anglo-American trade, not by any mutually agreed upon system, but by unilaterally issuing Orders in Council that, in particular, denied American traders access to the West Indies. All of this meant that the fragile Fox-North coalition was neither willing nor able to expand upon the preliminary treaty.

The details of the negotiations are amply dealt with in the letters and documents proceeding from the commissioners’ exchanges with xxiDavid Hartley. Of particular interest is a draft definitive treaty prepared by Adams in mid-July and submitted to Hartley in early August. It constituted the commissioners’ final effort, undertaken with little hope for success, to incorporate into the definitive treaty changes or additions desired by Congress and provisions usually found in commercial treaties.8 Hartley sent the draft to London, but it was apparently never considered seriously by the ministry. As a result, the commissioners were forced to resign themselves to signing again the preliminary articles to which only a preamble and an article on the treaty’s ratification had been added.

John Adams’ letters to Robert R. Livingston chart the growing anti-American sentiment in Britain and the declining prospects for the definitive treaty.9 He gleaned much of his information from newspapers and letters written from England by Henry Laurens and Edmund Jenings, both of whom provided detailed accounts of the changing attitudes of the British public and ministry toward America. Of particular interest is Laurens’ letter of 9 August describing his conferences with Charles James Fox earlier that month.10 Adams concluded that the British were shortsighted and mean-spirited, unable to recognize their true national interests regarding the United States. But he was also critical of Congress’ inability or unwillingness to regulate its own commerce so as to force British concessions and wondered at the American demand for the goods of its former enemy in contravention of its own interests.

Even as Adams and his colleagues pursued their desultory negotiations with Hartley, they anxiously awaited news from America about Congress’ reception of the preliminary treaty signed in November 1782. They had good reason for concern because in negotiating the treaty they had violated Congress’ instructions of 15 June 1781 to keep France informed of any negotiations and “to undertake nothing . . . without their knowledge & concurrence & ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice & opinion.”11 The commissioners’ wait ended in early July when Robert R. Livingston’s letters of 25 March and 21 April arrived, and they found their apprehensions to be fully justified.12 Livingston enclosed the ratified treaty but xxiisharply criticized the commissioners for their audacity in violating Congress’ instructions and notably for negotiating a separate, secret article concerning West Florida that favored Britain at the expense of France’s ally Spain.13 The commissioners were disturbed by Livingston’s criticism, attributing it to his lack of knowledge and understanding of the conditions under which the negotiations had taken place.

The often disputatious relationship between John Adams and Benjamin Franklin made John Jay the logical choice to draft the commissioners’ reply. But Adams favored the choice because he and Jay were of one mind regarding France and the peace negotiations. Thus it was that in the first portion of his draft Jay undertook a point-by-point defense of the commissioners’ negotiation of the treaty. He attributed their refusal to abide by Congress’ instructions to a fundamental conflict between American and French interests and uncertainty over the tenure of the Shelburne ministry. Franklin objected to Jay’s focus on France and the Comte de Vergennes, noting that it would be impolitic to raise such issues after the fact when the only result would be to roil Franco-American relations. The first portion of the draft was, therefore, omitted. The remainder focused on the separate article concerning West Florida and succinctly ascribed Livingston’s objections to his ignorance of the situation in Europe.14 Adams acquiesced in the decision to omit the offending portion of the draft, likely necessary if Franklin was to sign the letter. But he was unable to resist indulging his penchant for leaving nothing unsaid when to do so meant that the official record of the peace negotiations would be Franklin’s version. Thus Adams wrote letters to Livingston and Robert Morris in which he rehearsed the points made by Jay in the omitted portion of the draft and made it clear why, regardless of any sentiment to the contrary in Congress, the commissioners were fully justified in violating their instructions.15 Franklin did not permit Adams’ violation of the commissioners’ presumed agreement to omit the offending comments about France to go unchallenged. He wrote his own letter to Livingston on 22 July, there penning his famous characterization of xxiiiAdams as “sometimes and in some things absolutely out of his senses.”16

John Adams continued to criticize Congress’ conduct of foreign policy and the deleterious influence of the Comte de Vergennes and Benjamin Franklin, but his comments are less vitriolic than in previous volumes. This may reflect the fact that with peace concluded, the joint commission was effectively dissolved. Such was the commissioners’ response to Hartley’s proposal to open commercial negotiations following the signing of the definitive treaty.17 But his less confrontational tone also owes something to the fact that following Livingston’s resignation as secretary for foreign affairs, the commissioners were given virtually no direction by Congress, receiving only three letters between the beginning of June and the end of October.18

Even when Congress did act, the result was frustration. Adams had been eager to return to Massachusetts after the completion of the negotiations for the preliminary peace treaty. He had offered his resignation in early December 1782 and had hopes of returning to America in company with the Dutch minister to the United States, Pieter Johan van Berckel, when he sailed in June. Congress, however, had never acted upon his resignation, and the delay in the start of the negotiations for the definitive treaty made an early departure impossible.19 Adams longed for the sight of the Blue Hills near his home in Braintree and a reunion with his family and friends, but with the arrival of a letter from the president of Congress in early September his outlook dramatically changed. Enclosed with the letter was Congress’ resolution of 1 May by which Adams, Franklin, and Jay were to be commissioned to negotiate an Anglo-American commercial treaty.20 Feeling honored by his new responsibilities, Adams abandoned his plans to return to America and, instead, requested that his wife and daughter join him at Paris or The Hague.21 But Congress never implemented the 1 May resolution, and no commission to negotiate European treaties was actually issued until April 1784. With the passage of time and the failure of the promised new commission to arrive, Adams and his colleagues grew increasingly frustrated.

Adams gave considerable thought to the nature and purpose of American diplomatic representation in Europe. Francis Dana’s letters in June and July contributed to this, but so too did Franklin’s efforts to conclude treaties with Sweden, Portugal, and Denmark. Dana’s letters from St. Petersburg informed Adams of his progress toward achieving Russian recognition of the United States. But on the very brink of success—it remained only for news of the Anglo-American definitive treaty to reach the Russian capital—Dana received notice of his immediate recall, thereby ending his mission. Dana attributed this turn of events to the Comte de Vergennes’ influence and his desire to keep all American negotiation with European nations in Franklin’s hands.22 Dana’s fate was confirmation of what Adams already believed, and his views are clear in numerous letters complaining of Franklin’s assumption of powers he did not possess in the negotiating of treaties with Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal.23 In a letter to James Warren, Adams laid out the problem with particular clarity: “one Man seems to have a positive Spight against every public service, that he does not exclusively perform himself.— He opposes it and persecutes the Agent in it with a Malice and Rancour that is astonishing. I could have formed no Idea, that Jealousy Envy and Vanity could have gone such Lengths.” If Congress intended that treaties be negotiated and decided to issue a commission for that purpose, it “ought not to be given to one alone at Paris when three are obliged to reside there on another Negotiation. We should be all joined in it, and When We have compleated the Business We may all go home.”24

Since John Adams’ arrival in Europe in late 1779, he had often complained to his friends in America that they failed to write and keep him adequately informed of events in Congress, Massachusetts, and the nation. Adams’ American correspondents in volume 15, particularly those from Massachusetts, provide him with considerably more substantive intelligence than in previous years. This is partly because the arrival of peace made it easier to send letters to Europe, but it also reflected the writers’ interest in Adams’ opinions. xxvCotton Tufts and Richard Cranch solicited his views on the preliminary peace treaty’s provisions concerning loyalists, while others expressed their desire that he return to Massachusetts and stand for governor.25 A letter from Samuel Osgood was of particular interest because it laid out the factional divisions in Congress and the extent to which Osgood believed French influence had determined the course of American foreign policy and Congress’ response to Adams’ admonitions on the subject. In that letter and in another from Elbridge Gerry, Adams was warned about the reaction of members of Congress to his strictures on Benjamin Franklin, France, and the conduct of foreign policy.26 That their warnings had substance was evident when Franklin queried Adams and John Jay over reports from America that he had been less supportive of American interests during the peace negotiations than they had been. The reports stemmed largely from Adams’ “Peace Journal,” and Adams responded by quoting a passage from the “Journal” referring to Franklin.27

The vast ocean separating Adams from his correspondents and the time required for an exchange of letters affected Adams’ responses to the specific issues raised by his American friends. His answers tended to be cautionary, sometimes equivocal, rather than specific. But he could not avoid involvement in the debates then raging over the nation’s finances and, in consequence, the nature of the American government itself. Virtually all of Adams’ Massachusetts correspondents focused their attention on the acrimonious debates in the General Court over the twin issues of Congress’ impost and commutation.28 In 1780, Congress promised Continental Army officers who remained in service until the peace half-pay for life without specifying the source of the money. With the end of the war, many officers doubted whether the states could or would honor Congress’ commitment. Considerable unrest resulted, and the officers’ complaints, expressed in the Newburgh Addresses, raised the possibility of a military revolt against civilian authority. George Washington’s intervention relieved the immediate crisis, but Congress was forced to commute the half-pay for life into five years of full pay to be paid by Congress. The commutation and other xxviobligations, such as foreign loans, were to be financed by an impost levied on the states. Thus the central government, embodied in the Continental Congress, would be significantly strengthened at the expense of the sovereign states. Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris was the chief proponent for this alteration in the constitutional relationship between Congress and the states, and he became the lightening rod for those who opposed it. In Massachusetts the debate was particularly rancorous, and Adams received detailed accounts not only of the issues involved but also of the personalities on both sides. Indeed, the opposing arguments anticipated those of the Federalist-Antifederalist debate over the ratification of the United States Constitution. Adams’ correspondents who supported the impost and commutation, such as Tristram Dalton and Cotton Tufts, later became Federalists; while those in opposition, such as Elbridge Gerry and James Warren, became Antifederalists.

Adams’ replies to the letters from America were informed by his diplomatic experience. He was convinced that the United States required a government that could be relied upon to pay its debts, observe its treaty obligations, and protect its interests in matters such as Anglo-American trade. Regarding the inquiries from Cotton Tufts and Richard Cranch as to whether Articles 5 and 6 of the preliminary peace treaty concerning the loyalists were binding or merely recommendatory, Adams refused to go beyond the articles’ language and indicated that it was incumbent on all parties to a treaty to abide by its provisions.29 With regard to the controversy over the impost, Adams came down on the Federalist side, declaring in a letter to Robert Morris that “the Thirteen States in Relation to the discharge of the Debts of Congress, must consider them Selves as one Body, animated by one Soul.— The Stability of our Confederation at home, our Reputation abroad, our Power of Defence, the Confidence and affection of the People of one state towards those of another all depend upon it. Without a Sacred Regard to publick Justice no Society can Subsist. it is the only Tie which can unite Mens Minds and Hearts in pursuit of the common Interest.”30 It is no wonder that Morris used excerpts from two of Adams’ letters to spur passage of the impost.31

The fiscal well-being of the United States and the effectiveness of its government were also of interest to Europeans. This was xxviiparticularly so in the Netherlands, where Adams had raised a loan in 1782 and to which he paid a two-week visit at the end of July 1783. Adams’ principal reason for going was to reunite with his son John Quincy, whom he had not seen since the younger Adams departed for St. Petersburg with Francis Dana in 1781. Now returned, the sixteen-year-old had become “a Man in Understanding as well as Stature” and soon assumed a new role as his father’s secretary.32 John Adams, although absent since the previous October, was still minister to the Netherlands. His most critical task upon his arrival was to inquire about the progress of the Dutch loan. He visited Amsterdam, met with the loan consortium, and in consequence reported to Robert R. Livingston “that there is not one foreign Loan, open in this Republick which is in so good Credit, or goes so quick as mine.”33

Unfortunately Adams spoke too soon, and his optimism had an effect that he could not have foreseen. News reached Europe of the controversy over the impost and commutation and the resulting unrest in the army, but most telling for Europeans who doubted the long-term survival of the United States was the army mutiny in June over compensation that forced the Congress to flee Philadelphia.34 Dutch investors grew apprehensive over the new nation’s ability and willingness to meet its financial obligations, and subscriptions to Adams’ 1782 loan plummeted. Robert Morris, however, learned of Adams’ optimism about the loan and, taking him at his word, proceeded to issue vast sums in bills of exchange even as funds were drying up in Amsterdam. Alarmed that Morris expected his bills to be paid from the proceeds of the Dutch loan, the loan consortium wrote to Adams in October, shortly before he left Paris for London, indicating that a crisis might be in the making.35 At London, in December, Adams received additional letters from the consortium, each of them more dire in its evaluation of the situation.36 The bankers made it clear that there was no possibility of paying Morris’ bills and that if the United States defaulted on them, its financial position in Europe would be destroyed. After Benjamin Franklin informed Adams that neither he nor the bankers at Paris had the xxviiiresources to resolve the situation, Adams had no choice but to set off in early January 1784 on a dangerous winter journey to the Netherlands in order to make a last desperate effort to salvage the situation.37 When he arrived Adams was not encouraged by what he found, writing to Franklin that “I find I am here only to be a Witness that American Credit in this Republick is dead, never to rise again, at least untill the United States Shall all agree upon Some Plan of Revenue, and make it certain that Interest and Principal will be paid.”38 It quickly became clear that the only means to remedy the situation was to negotiate a new loan. On 29 January he authorized the consortium to make the attempt, noting that “it is neither your Fault nor mine, if We cannot Succeed, yet I should wish to do every Thing in our Power.”39

John Adams’ time and attention was not devoted solely to resolving matters of high diplomacy and finance. His correspondents in Europe were numerous, and the substance of their letters was eclectic. Edmund Jenings continued his efforts, largely unsuccessful, to draw Adams into his dispute with Henry Laurens over a 1781 letter by an anonymous author seeking to sow discord among the commissioners, which by the summer of 1783 had led to a pamphlet war between Jenings and Laurens.40 C. W. F. Dumas, the acting American chargé d’affaires at The Hague, kept Adams informed of the ongoing Anglo-Dutch peace negotiations, the continuing struggle between William V and the pro-American Patriot Party, and the Austrian effort to reopen the Scheldt River, which threatened to ignite an Austro-Dutch war.41 Antoine Marie Cerisier, editor of Le politique hollandais, served as Adams’ agent when, to educate Europeans about America, he sought to publish in the Netherlands the Abbé de Mably’s Observations sur le gouvernement et les loix des États-Unis d’Amerique after fruitless efforts to obtain its publication in France.42 Adams also received numerous appeals for assistance xxixfrom merchants, prospective immigrants, and former prisoners. Perhaps the most striking appeal came from an ex-prisoner, John Dudley, who provided horrendous accounts of his capture and captivity.43

In mid-September Adams became ill and moved from his rooms at the Hôtel du Roi on the Place du Carrousel to Thomas Barclay’s residence in Auteuil, where he would later live with Abigail after she arrived in Europe. Upon recovering he decided to visit England, perhaps with some thought of emulating Henry Laurens and John Jay and partaking of the waters at Bath. John and John Quincy Adams left Auteuil on 20 October and arrived at London on the 26th.44 The two Adamses spent a little over two months there, visiting museums, attending the theater, and acting the role of tourist. John Adams met with Charles James Fox and Edmund Burke but was unimpressed, and nothing of substance resulted.45 John and John Quincy visited Parliament at least twice. The first time was at its opening on 11 November, when they heard George III’s speech and witnessed the introduction of the Prince of Wales, who had reached his majority. They visited again on 15 December to witness the debate in the House of Lords over the India Bill, the outcome of which was the fall of the Fox-North coalition and its replacement by William Pitt’s first ministry. While John Adams did comment on his visit to London, it was John Quincy Adams who provided the more interesting accounts of their time in London, particularly of the visits to Parliament and to Thomas Pownall at Richmond Hill, and their short sojourn at Bath, a “sudden Resolution of my Father’s” according to John Quincy.46 Indeed it was at Bath that John Adams received the news that convinced him that the financial crisis concerning American credit had reached such great magnitude that he must immediately set off for the Netherlands, the fate of the nation again dependent on his efforts.

The volume ends with John Adams at the U.S. legation on the Fluwelen Burgwal at The Hague. He hoped to avert disaster but had little confidence that all would go well. At the end of 1780 Adams xxxhad reflected on the events of the previous twelve months and called it “the most anxious and mortifying Year of my whole Life.”47 He remembered it as such because he had ventured much and accomplished little. In many respects the eight months chronicled in volume 15 are similar. Adams and his colleagues “lost Seven or eight months” of their time negotiating the definitive treaty. The nature of Anglo-American commercial relations remained unresolved. Robert Morris’ bills of exchange seemed to herald the new nation’s financial ruin. There was much frustration and little satisfaction, for even his “vacation” in England ended in crisis and turmoil. But although he did not know it in January 1784, there was hope. His wife Abigail would soon join him. Congress would finally issue a joint commission to negotiate commercial treaties. A new loan in the Netherlands would succeed. And in the interim John Adams would remain as he always had been, steadfast, committed to his vision of America, ready to do whatever was necessary to advance its cause.

During the eight-month span of this volume, John Adams again used his letterbooks to provide himself with a record of his correspondence and activities. For the editors his effort continues to pay dividends because it provides a nearly complete run of his correspondence, even when the recipient’s copy is unavailable. The letterbook copies are also useful as the source for text lost from the recipient’s copy and, when they served as drafts, to compare with the letters as copied and sent. Adams also found the letterbooks useful in his role as documentary editor, for it was largely from them that he took the texts of letters that later appeared in his Autobiography and in the Boston Patriot.

In volume 15 Adams used Letterbooks 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, which correspond to reels 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, and 110 of the Adams Papers Microfilms. Detailed descriptions of the nature and content of these letterbooks appear in previous volumes, but some additional comments seem appropriate.48 Adams left Letterbooks 18 and 19 at the American legation at The Hague when he went to Paris in October 1782 to join the peace negotiations. He retrieved the letterbooks during his visit to the Netherlands in July and xxxiAugust 1783 and carried them back to Paris. When in October Adams went to England for the first time, he took Letterbook 19 with him and then brought it with him when he journeyed to The Hague in January 1784. It is notable that these two letterbooks are the first to have a substantial number of letters in John Quincy Adams’ hand. It also bears repeating that in all cases where a letterbook copy is mentioned in a descriptive note or annotation, the microfilm reel containing the letterbook is indicated.

In 2007 the editors of the Adams Papers undertook a full-scale review of the editorial practices guiding the project that resulted in a substantially revised editorial method. For a statement of that policy, see the Papers of John Adams, 14:xxix–xxxvii. Those wishing to trace the evolution of the editorial method from the beginnings of the editorial project should consult the Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, 1:lii–lxii, and the Papers of John Adams, 1:xxxi–xxxv; 9:xx–xxiii; 11:xx–xxi.

The Massachusetts Historical Society continues its efforts to make Adams family materials available to scholars and the public online. Three digital resources of particular interest to those who would use the Papers of John Adams volumes are Founding Families: Digital Editions of the Papers of the Winthrops and the Adamses, The Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive, and The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection. All are available through the Historical Society’s website at www.masshist.org.

The Founding Families Digital Editions, cosponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities, Harvard University Press, and the Massachusetts Historical Society, provides searchable text files of the 38 Adams Papers volumes published prior to 2007 (excluding the portraits volumes) as well as 7 volumes of the Winthrop Family Papers published by the Society. The Adams Papers volumes are supplemented by a cumulative index prepared by the Adams Papers editors. The digital edition is intended not to replace the letterpress edition but rather to supplement it by widening the access xxxiiof scholars and the public to the wealth of Adams material included therein.

The Adams Family Papers Electronic Archive contains images and text files of all of the correspondence between John and Abigail Adams owned by the Massachusetts Historical Society as well as John Adams’ diaries and autobiography. The files are completely searchable and can also be browsed by date.

The Diaries of John Quincy Adams Digital Collection provides images of John Quincy Adams’ entire 51-volume diary, which he kept for nearly seventy years. The images can be searched by date or browsed by diary volume.

Also of value to users of the Papers of John Adams is the online catalog of the John Adams Library at the Boston Public Library. The catalog includes a record of the marginalia entered by John Adams in his books as well as a growing number of digitized volumes. For additional information, see www.johnadamslibrary.org.

The letters and documents printed in this volume recount John Adams’ frustration at being unable to negotiate a more favorable definitive peace treaty, concern over the progress of the Dutch loan and America’s financial position in Europe, and activities as a tourist in London. But it is not the only documentary source that illuminates Adams’ life during this period. The 234 documents printed in and the 114 items omitted from the volume should be used in conjunction with the 72 documents for this period appearing in the Adams Family Correspondence (5:168–302). Those letters are particularly important for the eight months covered by volume 15 because many of the people writing to John Adams in Europe were also sharing information with Abigail at Braintree. Recourse should also be made to John Quincy Adams’ Diary (1:175–207), for the younger Adams described, in considerably more detail than his father, their reunion at The Hague in July and their trip to London in October. John Adams’ Diary and Autobiography (3:136–154) is useful regarding the early negotiations toward the definitive treaty, the visit to London, and the later winter journey to the Netherlands.