The drafting and dispatch of the commissioners’ 18 July letter to Robert R. Livingston has a curious history. What transpired and the consequences thereof reveal much about the relations between the commissioners, particularly John Adams and Benjamin Franklin.

On 2 July, Capt. Joshua Barney delivered to Passy letters from Robert R. Livingston, most notably those of 25 March and 21 April (to Livingston, 3 July, note 8, above). In those two letters Livingston criticized the commissioners for violating Congress’ instructions by negotiating and then signing the preliminary peace treaty without informing France, and he indicated his dissatisfaction with certain provisions, especially the separate article dealing with West Florida (vol. 14:361–364, 435–438). On the day following the letters’ arrival, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay met at Passy to consider their response.

Neither Adams nor his colleagues were pleased with Livingston’s strictures. In their view the secretary for foreign affairs failed to appreciate the difficulty of the negotiations or the need to complete them while the Shelburne ministry remained in office. A response was clearly needed, but who would frame the reply and what form would it take? Years later Adams explained that he and John Jay agreed as to the substance of the response, 141but when Jay asked him “to draw up the answer in form,” he declined and insisted that Jay undertake the task. This was owing to Livingston’s longstanding, and well-known, prejudice against Adams’ diplomacy, the history of conflict between Adams and the Comte de Vergennes, and Adams’ past remarks about Congress’ conduct of foreign policy. But the most important reason for the choice of Jay was the “importance to us all, that we should all agree in our answer to Mr. Livingston,” and Adams thought it “more probable that Dr. Franklin would agree to subscribe a draught of Mr. Jay, than his other colleague” (Boston Patriot, 15 Feb. 1812).

John Jay completed his draft, probably on or about 5 July, and Adams was pleased with the result of his friend’s labors. This was particularly true of the first portion of the document, in which Jay presented a spirited, uncompromising defense of the commissioners’ efforts to deal with the inherent conflict between French and American interests in a peace treaty and their resulting decision to violate Congress’ instructions. Adams later declared that “it was a great consolation and a high gratification to me, to see recorded the testimony of Mr. Jay, to so complete a justification of every thing I had ever said or written concerning the king, the nation, the court, or the minister of foreign relations” (same, 19 Feb. 1812).

And there lay the crux of the problem facing the commissioners. For if Jay’s response was simply a rehearsal of Adams’ views of the peace negotiations, the conduct of foreign policy, and the proper course for Franco-American relations, there was little chance that Benjamin Franklin would agree. And such was the case. Upon reading the draft Franklin wrote to Jay, asking “whether it may not be adviseable to forbear, at present, the Justification of ourselves, respecting the Signature of the Préliminaries; because That matter is, at present, quiet here; No Letter sent to the Congress is ever kept secret; The Justification contains some Charges of unfavourable Disposition in the Ministers here towards us, that will give offense & will be deny’d.” Moreover, “the Congress do not call upon us for an Account of our Conduct, or its Justification. They have not by any Resolution blamed us. What Censure we have received is only the private Opinion of Mr. L.” Finally, he noted that Henry Laurens, then in Bath, England, was concerned in the matter and should be consulted prior to any final decision on the letter’s content (LbC-Tr, APM Reel 103). Franklin’s concern is evident from his 6 July letter to Laurens indicating that he wanted the South Carolinian at Paris “on many Accounts, and should be glad of your Assistance in considering and answering our public Letters. There are Matters in them of which I cannot conveniently give you an Account at present” (Laurens, Papers , 16:231–232). At this point, 5 or 6 July, it must have been clear to Adams and Jay that Franklin would refuse to send the reply at least until Laurens was consulted if the letter remained in its current form. Adams later asserted “that Dr Franklin would have signed it too, rather than have been singular,” but that is more the product of the vagaries of Adams’ memory in 1812 than a reflection of reality in July 1783 (Boston Patriot, 19 Feb. 1812).

Benjamin Franklin’s desire to consult Henry Laurens was probably the reason why almost two weeks passed before the final text of the letter to Livingston was determined. The commissioners at Paris likely expected Laurens to receive Franklin’s letter at Bath by the 11th or 12th and be at Paris by the 16th or 17th. But Laurens did not get the letter until the 17th and arrived only on the 23d (Laurens, Papers , 16:241). In the meantime the reply, if it was not to be delayed indefinitely, had to go with Capt. Joshua Barney of the packet General Washington; he was about to return to America with the commissioners’ dispatches, and John Adams was leaving for the Netherlands on the 19th (to Livingston, 23 July, below). Therefore, pressed for time, Adams, Franklin, and Jay, on or about 18 July, prepared a fair copy of the letter for signature prior to Adams’ departure. Presumably then, in order to obtain Franklin’s signature, the final decision was made to omit Jay’s draft opening. Adams would later recall that “I thought it would be cruel in me, to constrain his signature to so perfect a vindication of me, and condemnation of himself. We all now lived and conducted business together in tolerable harmony and good humour; I therefore readily agreed to accommodate the letter to the Doctor’s taste. Enough however was left, and signed and sent to congress to justify us all” (Boston Patriot, 19 Feb. 1812). When Henry Laurens arrived at Paris five days later and was shown the signed letter, he drafted a new opening of his own (LbC-Tr, APM Reel 103). But with Barney’s departure imminent it presumably was decided to send the letter as signed rather than await John Adams’ return, and as Laurens played no role in its drafting he did not add his signature.

The initial decision to defer sending the letter as drafted by John Jay and the final one to send it without the opening paragraphs had consequences. As early as 5 or 6 July, John Adams probably realized that Jay’s ringing defense of the commissioners’ negotiation of the Anglo-American peace treaty was unlikely to be included in any letter signed by himself, Franklin, and Jay. It is also probable that Franklin viewed the deferral as at least a tacit agreement between himself and his colleagues that they would not raise issues in their letters to America that would undermine a united response to Livingston’s letters. If this was so, it was an assumption not shared by Adams, who apparently decided that if the commissioners as a group were unable or unwilling to reveal to Congress and the world the truth about French efforts to compromise American interests during the peace negotiations, he would do so himself. Therefore, beginning with his 5 July letter to Robert Morris and continuing in letters of 9, 10, and 11 July to Robert R. Livingston (all above), Adams incorporated the substance of Jay’s opening, thereby raising the very issues that Benjamin Franklin thought too impolitic to reveal to Congress. It is likely that Franklin soon learned of his colleague’s “indiscretion,” and it was that knowledge and an unwillingness to allow views he thought dangerous to Franco-American relations to go unchallenged that led him to write his memorable letter to Livingston of 22 July. There, after expressing his belief in the fundamental benevolence of France and the Comte de Vergennes toward the United 143States, Franklin turned his attention to JA, declaring that “one of my colleagues is of a very different opinion from me in these matters” and “I am persuaded . . . that he means well for his country, is always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things absolutely out of his senses” (Wharton, Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev. , 6:581–582).

The history of the composition and dispatch of the 18 July letter to Livingston clearly was important to the commissioners at the time. This is evident from the fact that all of the relevant documents, including Jay’s draft opening, Franklin’s note regarding the draft, Henry Laurens’ alternative draft, and the 18 July letter itself are all present in the letterbook chronicling the peace negotiations and prepared by Jean L’Air de Lamotte, for which see APM Reel 103. It was from that source that John Adams copied those four documents and published them in the Boston Patriot of 15 and 19 February 1812, apparently the only instance in which all four have appeared together.

We have had the honour of receiving by Capt. Barney your two Letters of the 25th: of March and 21st of April, with the Papers referred to in them.1

We are happy to find that the Provisional Articles have been approved & ratified by Congress, and we regret that the Manner in which that Business was conducted, does not coincide with your Ideas of Propriety. We are persuaded however that this is principally owing to your being necessarily unacquainted with a Number of Circumstances, known to us who were on the Spot, and which will be particularly explained to you hereafter, and, we trust, to your Satisfaction, & that of the Congress.2

Your Doubts respecting the Separate Article we think are capable of being removed, but as a full State of the Reasons and Circumstances which prompted that Measure would be very prolix, we shall content ourselves with giving you the general Outlines.

Mr. Oswald was desirous to cover as much of the Eastern Shores of the Missisippi with British Claims as possible and for this purpose we were told a great deal about the ancient Bounds of Canada & Louisiana &ca &ca &ca The British Court who had probably not yet adopted the Idea of relinquishing the Floridas, seemed desirous of anexing as much Territory to them as possible, even up to the Mouth of the Ohio— Mr. Oswald adhered strongly to that Object as well to render the British Countries there of sufficient Extent to be, (as he express’d it) worth keeping & protecting, as to afford a convenient Retreat to the Tories for whom it would be difficult 144otherwise to provide; and among other Arguments he finally urged his being willing to yield to our Demands to the East, North and West, as a further Reason for our gratifying him on the Point in Question. He also produced the Commission of Govr. Johnson extending the Bounds of his Government of W. Florida up to the River Yassous and contended for that Extent as a Matter of Right upon various Principles which however we did not admit.3

We were of Opinion that the Country in Contest was of great Value both on Account of its natural Fertility, and of its Position; it being in our Opinion the Interest of America to extend as far down towards the Mouth of the Missisippi as we possibly could. We also thought it adviseable to impress Britain with a strong Sense of the Importance of the Navigation of that River, to their future Commerce on the interior Waters from the Mouth of the River St Lawrens to that of the Missisippi, and thereby render that Court averse to any Stipulations with Spain to relinquish it. These two objects militated against each other; because to inhance the Value of the Navigation was also to inhance the Value of the Countries contiguous to it, and thereby disincline Britain to the Dereliction of them. We thought therefore that the surest Way to reconcile & obtain both Objects would be by a Composition beneficial to both Parties. We therefore proposed that Britain should withdraw her Pretensions to all the Country above the Yassous and that we would cede all below it to her in Case she should have the Floridas at the End of the War, and at all Events that she should have a Right to navigate the River throughout its whole Extent. This Proposition was accepted, and we agreed to insert the contingent Part of it in a separate Article, for the express purpose of keeping it secret for the present. That Article ought not therefore to be consider’d as a mere Matter of Favour to Britain, but as the Result of a Bargain, in which that Article was a “quid pro quo.” It was in our Opinion both necessary & justifiable to keep this Article secret. The Negotiations between Spain France & Britain were then in full Vigour, and embarrass’d by a Variety of clashing Demands. The Publication of this Article would have irritated Spain, and retarded if not have prevented her coming to an Agreement with Britain. Had we mentioned it to the French Minister, he must have not only informed Spain of it, but also been obliged to act a Part respecting it that would probably have been disagreable to America, and he certainly has reason to rejoice that our Silence saved him that delicate and disagreable Task. This was an Article in which France had not the 145smallest Interest, nor is there any thing in her Treaty with us, that restrains us from making what Bargain we pleased with Britain about those or any other Lands, without rendering Account of such Transaction to her or any other Power whatever. The same Observation applies with still greater Force to Spain, and neither Justice or Honour forbid us to dispose as we pleased of our own Lands, without her Knowledge or Consent. Spain at that very time extended her Pretensions and Claim of Dominion not only over the Tract in Question, but over the Vast Region lying between the Floridas and Lake Superior; and this Court was also at that very Time soothing & nursing of those Pretensions by a proposed conciliatory Line for splitting the Difference. Suppose therefore we had offer’d this Tract to Spain in Case She retained the Floridas, should we even have had Thanks for it? or would it have abated the Chagrin she experienc’d from being disappointed in her extravagant and improper Designs on that whole Country? we think not.—

We perfectly concur with you in Sentiment, Sir, “That Honesty is the best Policy” but untill it be shewn that we have tresspass’d on the Rights of any Man or Body of men, you must excuse our thinking that this Remark as applied to our Proceedings was unnecessary.4

Should any Explanations either with France or Spain become necessary on this Subject, we hope & expect to meet with no Embarrassments. We shall neither amuse them nor perplex ourselves with ostensible and flimsy Excuses, but tell them plainly that as it was not our Duty to give them the Information, we consider’d ourselves at Liberty to withhold it, and we shall remind the French Minister that he has more Reason to be pleased than displeased with our Silence. Since we have assumed a Place in the Political System of the World let us move like a Primary & not like a Secondary Planet.

We are persuaded, Sir, that your Remarks on these Subjects resulted from real Opinion, and were made with all Candour and Sincerity. The Best Men will view Objects of this Kind in different Lights even when standing on the same Ground; and it is not to be wonder’d at that we who are on the Spot and have the whole Transaction under our Eyes should see many Parts of it in a stronger Point of Light then Persons at a Distance, who can only view it through the dull Medium of Representation.

It would give us great Pain if any thing we have written, or now write respecting this Court, should be construed to impeach the 146Friendship of the King & Nation for us. We also believe that the Minister is so far our Friend, and is disposed so far to do us Good Offices, as may correspond with, and be dictated by his System of Policy for Promoting the Power, Riches and Glory of France. God forbid that we should ever sacrifice our Faith, our Gratitude, or our Honour, to any Consideration of Convenience; and may he also forbid that we should ever be unmindful of the Dignity and independant Spirit which should always characterize a free and generous People.—

We shall immediately propose an Article to be inserted in the Definitive Treaty for postponing the Payment of British Debts for the Time mentioned by Congress.5

There are, no doubt, certain Ambiguities in our Articles, but it is not to be wonder’d at when it is consider’d how exceedingly averse Britain was to Expressions which explicitly wounded the Tories; and how disinclined we were to use any that should amount to absolute Stipulations in their Favour.

The Words for restoring the Property of Real British Subjects were well understood and explained between us not to mean or comprehend American Refugees. Mr. Oswald and Mr. Fitz-Herbert know this to have been the Case, and will readily confess and admit it. This mode of Expression was preferr’d by them as a more delicate Mode of excluding those Refugees, and of making a proper Distinction between them and the Subjects of Britain whose only particular Interest in America consisted in holding Lands or Property there.6

The 6th. Article vizt. where it declares that no future Confiscations shall be made &ca ought to have fixed the Time with greater Accuracy: We think the most fair and true Construction is, that it relates to the Date of the Cessation of Hostilities. That is the Time when Peace in Fact took Place, in consequence of Prior informal tho’ binding Contracts to terminate the War. We consider the Definitive Treaties as only giving the Dress of Form to those Contracts, and not as constituting the Obligation of them. Had the Cessation of Hostilities been the Effect of a Truce, & consequently nothing more than a temporary Suspension of War, another Construction would have been the true one.7

We are Officially assured by Mr. Hartley that positive Orders for the Evacuation of New-York have been dispatched, and that no avoidable Delay will retard that Event. Had we proposed to fix a Time for it, the British Court would have contended that it should 147be a Time posterior to the Date of the definitive Treaty and that would have been probably more disadvantageous to us than as that Article now stands.

We are surprized to hear that any Doubts have arisen in America respecting the Time when the Cessation of Hostilities took Place there. It most certainly took Place at the Expiration of one Month after the Date of that Declaration in all Parts of the World whether Land or Sea that lay North of the Latitude of the Canaries.8

The Ships afterwards taken from us in the more Northerly Latitudes ought to be reclaimed and given up: We shall apply to Mr. Hartley on this Subject, and also on that of the Transportation of Negroes from New York contrary to the Words and Intention of the Provisional Articles.—9

With great Esteem, we / have the honour to be, / Sir, / Your most obedient / & most humble / Servants.