RC (Adams Papers); addressed: “à Son Excellence / Monsieur Adams, Mine / plenipo: des Etats-Unis / d’Am. / Paris.”; internal address: “Paris, à Son Exce. Mr. Adams,”; endorsed: “Mr Dumas 10. Decr / 1782.”

Jan W. van Arp was an Amsterdam merchant. For a renewal of his request for a passport when the vessel's captain changed, see Dumas’ letter of 12 Dec., below.

In his letter of 12 Dec., below, Dumas referred to these events as “la Conjuration des Cocardes,” or the Cockade Conspiracy, because of the orange cockades defiantly worn by the rioters. The demonstrations broke out at The Hague on 6 Dec. and continued the following day. They stemmed from a speech by William V, in which he decried efforts to limit his rights and prerogatives. He was particularly critical of the States of Holland for its role in undermining his office, including its prohibition against demonstrations in support of the stadholder and the House of Orange. If William V and his advocates believed that their efforts would rehabilitate the House of Orange and the office of stadholder, they were disappointed. In fact the events put the Patriot Party and the States of Holland on guard and marked a waypoint on the path of the Patriots’ ascendancy to power that ended only with the stadholder's restoration in 1787 in the wake of the Prussian occupation of the Netherlands (Schama, Patriots and Liberators , p. 87–132; Rowen, Princes of Orange , p. 215–228). For newspaper accounts of the disorders, see the Gazette d’Amsterdam, 10, 13 December.

Pierre Gosse, the publisher of the Dutch language Gravenhaagse Na-Courant and its French equivalent the Gazette de la Haye. Gosse was identified by name in the Gazette d’Amsterdam of 13 December. In a letter to Robert R. Livingston of 1 Jan. 1783, Dumas reported that publication of the Gazette de la Haye had been provisionally suspended for six weeks (PCC, No. 93, II, f. 208–210).

In a letter to Livingston of 12 Dec., Dumas wrote that efforts to recruit the peat-carriers, who had played an active role in the 1748 disorders in support of the stadholder, failed because they had learned from past experience to be wiser in the future (same, f. 141–143).

A courier sent by Brantsen with news of the signing of the preliminaries reached The Hague on the night of 6 Dec. (Gazette d’Amsterdam, 10 Dec.), but there is no indication as to how Dumas learned of JA's lengthy discussion with Brantsen on 3 Dec. concerning the preliminary treaty and its implications for the Netherlands (JA, D&A , 3:85–88). The rumor was presumably that the United States, by signing a preliminary peace treaty with England, had abandoned the war and its cobelligerent the 119Netherlands. This made the Patriot Party and its supporters in the States General and the States of Holland responsible for the consequences to Dutch interests because, in opposition to the stadholder, their support for the American cause had brought on the Anglo-Dutch war. JA's assurances to Brantsen that the treaty was preliminary and would become effective only when Britain made peace with France satisfied Dumas and his Patriot friends. For the moment, the rumor had been quashed and efforts to restore the power and influence of the stadholder at the expense of the Patriots had been effectively countered. This explains Dumas’ consternation over JA's assertions not being made public and his view that the failure to do so contributed to the disorders at The Hague (see note 4). The failure to conclude a peace treaty on 20 Jan. 1783, when Britain signed agreements with France and Spain, gave substance to the rumored betrayal of the Netherlands by its ostensible allies. For the initial reaction of the shocked and angry Patriots, see Dumas’ letters of 24 and 28 Jan., both below.

These decisions by towns in Friesland and Holland are evidence of the Patriot Party's success in promoting democracy in the municipalities at the expense of the stadholder prerogatives. See, for example, a report dated 30 Nov. from Dokkum in Friesland that appeared in the Gazette d’Amsterdam of 6 Dec. and is mentioned by Dumas in his 12 Dec. letter, below.

This may be the data on European armies that JA requested in his 8 Nov. letter, above. If so, Dumas experienced additional delays, for he was unable to comply with the request, and then only partially, until 16 Jan. 1783, below.

MS (Adams Papers); endorsed: “Minutes of Articles to be / proposed in the definitive / Treaty.” Filmed at [Dec. 1782 – June 1783].

These dates are derived from JA's Diary entries for 10, 12, and 13 Dec. (JA, D&A , 3:94–96). In the first, JA indicated that Franklin “was for beginning early to think about the Articles of the difinitive Treaty” and then listed the five items that comprise Nos. 1, 6, 4, 5, and 9 in this document. On the 12th the commissioners “consulted about Articles to be inserted in the definitive Treaty” and on the 13th Franklin showed JA the article regarding noncombatants that is alluded to in No. 2. The preparation of these proposals reflected the commissioners’ expectation that negotiations, preferably with 120Richard Oswald, would begin soon. In fact substantive discussions began only after David Hartley arrived at Paris in late April. It should also be noted that the first three proposals were more suited to a commercial treaty and reflected the expectation that some sort of Anglo-American commercial agreement would be signed along with a definitive peace treaty. In the end, however, none of the proposals were included in the definitive treaty and there was no commercial agreement. The articles listed here should be compared with Franklin's longer “Sketch,” which notably proposed “that the Subjects of the United States and those of the King of Great Britain shall not be deemed Aliens in the Dominions of either, but enjoy the same Rights of Citizenship” (Franklin, Papers , 38:433–435). For JA's acceptance of this proposal, see his draft articles for a supplemental treaty, [ca. 27 April 1783], below.

This refers to the conventions between Russia, Denmark, and Sweden by which the three nations established an Armed Neutrality based on the principles enunciated by Catherine II in her declaration of 10 March 1780. For those conventions, as well as the declarations of other nations acceding to those principles and other relevant documents, see Scott, Armed Neutralities , p. 273–436. For the principles contained in Catherine's declaration and their importance for JA and the United States, see vol. 9:121–126. That the principles of the Armed Neutrality should be included in a peace or commercial settlement with Great Britain had a substantive basis, for although the commissioners’ June 1781 instructions said nothing about it, Congress had resolved on 5 Oct. 1780 to direct its ministers in Europe to seek admission to the confederation of neutrals ( JCC , 18:905–906). This led JA to make a concerted effort in early March 1781 to achieve Congress’ objective (vol. 11:182–185), while accession to the Armed Neutrality was the principal purpose of Francis Dana's mission to Russia. Indeed, the proposal here was included verbatim in the commissioners’ 12 Dec. letter to Dana, below.

This proposal reflected beliefs long held by Franklin that included, although not stated here, the abolition of privateering. For his reasons for such a proposal and the text of his proposed article, see Franklin, Papers , 37:609–610, 618–620; 38:444–445. For the later implementation of these principles, at least regarding “Cultivators of the earth, artizans, manufacturers, and fishermen,” see Art. 23 of the 1785 Prussian-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Miller, Treaties , 2:178–179).

This proposal reflected the inclusion of such an article in the French and Dutch treaties of amity and commerce of 1778 and 1782, Arts. 8 and 23, respectively (Miller, Treaties , 2:8–9, 78).

This concerned the right of American fishermen to dry and cure fish on Sable Island, which is located 100 miles off the coast of Nova Scotia. JA had asserted during the negotiations that it was a traditional right of American fishermen (JA, D&A , 3:45–46, 74). The stipulation was specifically mentioned in Art. 3 of the proposed treaty that Richard Oswald presented to the commissioners on 25 Nov., above, but was not explicitly acknowledged in either the preliminary or definitive treaties.

This proposal was not adopted until the Treaty of Washington of 1871 (Morris, Peacemakers , p. 416).

This proposal was intended to promote the humane treatment of prisoners of war by ensuring that the captors would receive compensation to cover their expenses at the conclusion of peace. For the implementation of this principle and other matters concerning the treatment of prisoners, see Art. 24 of the 1785 Prussian-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Miller, Treaties , 2:179–181).