Papers of John Adams, volume 10

From Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, 28 November 1780 Capellen tot den Pol, Joan Derk, Baron van der JA

1780-11-28

From Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, 28 November 1780 Capellen tot den Pol, Joan Derk, Baron van der Adams, John
From Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol
Monsieur Zwol 28 Nov: 1780

J'étois Sur le point de Vous écrire lorsque je me vis honoré de votre 375Lettre du 20 du Courant. Je Vous ai beaucoup d'obligation de la brochure Francoise,1 que Vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoier. Elle ne manquera pas de guerir bien de prejugés; mais aussi, a ce que j'ai deja remarqué, elle allarmera les Peuples Commerçans, qui craigneront quils ne Seront pas en etat de Soutenir la Concurrence des Americains ni dans les Pecheries, ni dans le Commerce de Cabotage et de Fret, ni dans celui des Indes. C'est une remarque qu'un Ami tres eclairé me fit apres la lecture de la dite Brochure.

Quant a la proposition, dont Vous m'avez honoré;2 J'en ai pesé le Pour et le Contre avec cette prevention en faveur du premier, qui est l'effet naturel de mon zele pour le bonheur des deux Peuples, et de mon desir ardent de les voir Se rapprocher, Se lier, S'unir, malgré les efforts de Ceux, qui, malheureusement avec trop de Succes, necessent d'accumuler obstacle Sur obstacles, afin de prevenir, pour toujours, S'il leur est possible, un evenement Si desirable. J'ai con sulté Surcette affaire delicate mes meilleurs Amis, et le resultat a eté: qu'entamer ouvertement en mon nom une Negociation en faveur des Etats Unis Seroit donner de gaieté de Coeur dans les embuches que mes ennemis ne cessent de dresser sous mes pas. Et Surement, Monsieur, la persecution entamée Contre Monsieur Van Berckel et Ses Complices, c'est a dire contre tous ceux qui ont eu quelque correspondance avec les Americains,3 montre ce que jaurois a attendre, Si je me rendois coupable de ce que le Roi d'Angleterre ne manqueroit pas de faire valoir comme un acte, par lequel j'aurois favorisé et soutenu la Rebellion dans ses Etats. Quelle ne Seroit pas la Satisfaction, que l'on demanderoit d'une part, et que, Sans hesiter, l'on donneroit de l'autre contre un Magistrat obligé de maintenir les Traités avec la grande Bretagne, que notre Republique, cherissant Ses fers, n'a pas encore trouvé bon de revoquer; contre un Individu, qui deja l'objet de la haine la plus effrenée, reclamant depuis Si longtems vainement la protection des Loix, Seroit Seul responsable de ses Actions, Sans pouvoir, comme Monsieur Van Berckel et autres, se retrencher sur les ordres de Ses Superieurs, d'ont ils n'ont été que les executeurs.

Dailleurs, Monsieur, je Suis persuadé que mon nom ne contribueroit en rien a la reussite. Jamais le Credit de l'Amerique n'a eté Si bas qu'a cette heure. La prise de Charlestown, l'invasion de la Georgie et de la Caroline Meridionale; la defaite du General Gates, échecs que les Americains non pas encore compensés par aucun avantage de quelque consideration; l'inaction des Flottes combinées de Solano et Guichen; la Superiorité decidée des Anglois aux Indes 376Occidentales et a New York; la defection d'Arnold revue, corrigée et augmentée par les nouvellistes Anglois. Voila plus qu'il n'en faut pour faire chanceler un credit etabli. Ajoutez a ceci la crainte d'etre enveloppé comme complice de Monsieur van Berckel, et, ce qui restera a jamais un obstacle chez bien de gens dans ce pais, la peur que l'on a de desobliger le P——ce d'O——ge . . . et calculer S'il ÿ a pour le present la moindre esperance pour la reussite d une negociation, a laquelle je me serois preté, S'il eut été faisable, avec tout le zele dònt je Suis animé pour la cause de la liberté generale du genre Humain. J'avois meme tracé un plan, qui auroit beaucoup facilité l'entreprise. Monsieur T——aar auroit administré la Comptoir General et je vous aurois proposé d'emploier Trois ou quatre personnes d'influence et de probité dans les differentes Provinces pour ÿ recevoir les deniers de l'emprunt et ÿ paÿer deux fois par an les interets. Pour les profits je les aurois cedés entierement aux Emploiés, me contentant d'un Simple dedommagement. Mon plan de conduite dans le Monde Politique exige ce renoncement, afin de tenir, comme je l'ai pu faire jusquicÿ, mes ennemis dans l'impossibilité de m'attribuer les motifs, par lesqu'els ils agissent eux memes.

Cependant, Monsieur, Je Vous prie de ne pas trop presser votre depart.4 Les affaires de la Republique Sont dans une violente crise. Le Tems Seul pourroit dans peu lever une grande partie des empechemens Susdits. Le C——ss lui meme peut ÿ contribuer beaucoup en ne nous laissant pas, comme jusqu'icÿ, Sans informations authentiques touchant le veritable état des affaires de l'Amerique. C'est d'elles que depend tout Son credit. Il n'acquerera Jamais de la consistance dans ce Païs, Si longtems que l'on n'ÿ Sera point gueri de Ses prejugés touchant la foiblesse de l'Amerique et en faveur de la Toute Puissance de la Grande Bretagne. Le C—ss devroit envoier regulierement une ou deux fois par mois de petits paquetbots, uniquement afin de ne jamais laisser le champ libre au Nouvellistes Anglois. Lorsque Henri IV fit arreter le Marechal de Biron5 il envoia des Couriers par toute l'Europe—et jusqu'icÿ (d'autant que je sache) l'on n'a de la defection d'Arnold que les recits surement exagérés du Ministere Britannique!

Je crains d'abuser de votre attention; mais je ne saurois, avant de finir, m'empecher de Vous avertir de Vous méfier de la jalousie qui devore les Negocians de ce Païs. Rabattez toujours quelque chose des informations que l'on Vous donne a leur Sujet. Je Suis Sur que la reûssite de la Negociation ne depend pas autant que l'on veut vous persuader du Choix de la Maison, qui S'en charge, que des causes Susmentionnées. Il est tres indifferent pour les preteurs de qui ils 377recoivent les Contracts, Signés dailleurs en forme requise, et les Interets. Ce qui les interesse plus cest que ce Soit le plus pres possible du lieu de leur demeure pour eviter les frais de transport. Vous connoissez mieux que moi les affaires de Mr. T——aar. Mais Si celui cÿ ne convient pas (ce dont je ne Saurois juger) je ne vois aucune objection pour ne pas confier l'entreprise a Monsieur J: de Neufville. Il a fait autrefois de fortes depenses. Il a essuié des pertes, mais avec tout cela il est entré dans le Commerce avec un million de florins. Il a fait de grandes affaires et les fait aujourdhui plus grandes que jamais. Il est un des plus anciens et des plus zelés Amis de l'Amerique. Il jouit de la confiance et de la consideration de la Regence d'Amsterdam. La confiance qu'elle a eue en Lui de l'emploier a cette negociation Secrette6 Lui donne du Relief, lequel joint a un peu d'imprudence de sa part Lui attire de la jalousie, et peut etre de l'envie.

La Maison qu'il Seroit le plus naturel d'emploier Seroit celle de Fizeaux et Grand. Mais la connection du dernier avec un General Anglois servant en Amerique merite surement reflection.7

Quant a la conduite des Anglois. Je crains que leur but (outre celui en general d'amuser la Republique par des negociations et des memoires de part et dautre) ne Soit de nous entrainer en guerre avant d'etre admis a la Neutralité Armée, afin de donner occasion aux Puissances Confederées de pouvoir nous refuser comme n'aiant pas la qualification requise, Savoir, d'etre une Puissance Neutre; ou bien, si cela leur manque, de nous faire la guerre sous le pretexte Specieux d'avoir violé la Neutralité par notre correspondance avec les Rebelles de la Couronne, afin de fournir aux Puissances Liguées une anse pour pouvoir, S'ils le veulent ou Si l'influence des Anglois les ÿ porte, nous refuser les Secours Stipulés Sous pretexte de la non existence du Casus foederis. La Republique, meme la Province de Hollande, a ce que l'on debite, va faire un desaveu formel de ce que la Ville d'Amsterdam a fait. C'est tout ce que je crois étre en son pouvoir, car de faire punir les Complices de ce complot est au dessus de leurs forces. Si donc le Memoire de Monsieur Y——ke n'est pas une Simple Rodomontade la guerre est inevitable et une guerre quasi vero8 pour un demelé, qui n'est pas du ressort de la Neutralité Armée. J'espere de retourner a Amsterdam dans 3 semaines et je suis en attendant avec tout le respect possible Monsieur votre tres humble et tres obeïssant serviteur,

C——n de P——l

P.S. Je prens la liberté de vous offrir un exemplaire de mon discours 378ou Avis Sur la Brigade Ecossoise. La Resolution des Etats y jointe n'est quun petit échantillon des procedés étranges tenus a mon egard.9 Lon a commencé par Le defaire de mes discours et l'on a fini par le defaire de ma personne, le tout Sans forme de proces, et pour des causes ou le droit, la justice, l'équité le devoir etoient notoirement de mon coté. L'on a cherché de Statuer un exemple, et vraiement Vestigia terrent!10

La garnison de cette Ville vient de recevoir ordre hier au Soir de se rendre dans la Nord Hollande. Il semble que lon apprehende les menaces des Anglois!

Oserois je vous charger de mes complimens pour Monsieur Gillon et de Lui dire que j'ai recu La lettre que je communiquerai demain en personne a mon Cousin le Seigneur de Marsch.11

Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol to John Adams: A Translation, 28 November 1780 Capellen tot den Pol, Joan Derk, Baron van der JA

1780-11-28

Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol to John Adams: A Translation, 28 November 1780 Capellen tot den Pol, Joan Derk, Baron van der Adams, John
Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol to John Adams: A Translation
Sir Zwolle, 28 November 1780

I was on the verge of writing you when I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th instant. I am much obliged to you for the French pamphlet1 that you were good enough to send me. It will not fail to heal many prejudices; but, as I have previously remarked, it will alarm the commercial nations, which may fear that they may not be in a condition to withstand the competition of the Americans whether in fisheries, the coasting trade and the commerce of freight, or that of the Indies. A very enlightened friend made this observation to me after reading the aforementioned pamphlet.

As to the proposition with which you have honored me;2 I have weighed the pro and con with that predisposition toward the former which is the natural effect of my zeal for the well-being of both nations, and of my ardent desire to see them draw nearer, form ties, and unite, despite the efforts of those who, unfortunately with too much success, interminably pile obstacle upon obstacle so as to prevent forever if they can, so desirable an event. Concerning this delicate matter I have consulted my best friends, and the result was: that to enter openly in my own name into a negotiation in favor of the United States would be to plunge blithely into the traps that my enemies are forever placing in my path. And surely, sir, the persecution launched against Mr. van Berckel and his confederates that is, against all those who have had some correspondence with the Americans,3 shows what I should have to expect, if I were to make myself guilty of what the King of England would not fail to portray as an act, whereby I should allegedly have encouraged and supported the rebellion in his states. What satisfaction might not be demanded on one side and unhesitatingly granted on the other against a magistrate obliged to uphold treaties with Great Britain, which our Republic, cherishing its irons, has not yet seen fit to revoke, against an 379individual, already the object of the fiercest hatred and having for so long demanded in vain the protection of the laws, who would be solely responsible for his actions and unable to claim, as Mr. van Berckel and others do, the protection of acting on the orders of his superiors, of whose will they have been merely the executors.

Furthermore, sir, I am convinced that my name would in no way contribute to success. Never has the credit of America stood so low as it does at this hour. The capture of Charlestown, the invasion of Georgia and South Carolina; the defeat of General Gates, failures that the Americans have yet to compensate by any advantage worthy of consideration; the inaction of the combined fleets of Solano and Guichen; the decisive superiority of the English in the West Indies and in New York; the defection of Arnold, revised, corrected, and amplified by English pamphleteers. All this is more than is needed to undermine even a well-established credit. Add to this the fear of being counted among the confederates of Mr. van Berckel, and, what will forever remain an impediment for many people in this country, the fear one has of disobliging the Prince of Orange . . . and calculate whether, for the time being, there is the slightest hope of success for a negotiation, to which I should have lent myself, had it been feasible, with all the zeal that animates me in the cause of the general liberty of the human race. I had even sketched out a plan, which would have greatly facilitated the undertaking. Mr. Tegelaar would have administered the general treasury and I would have proposed that you employ three or four persons of influence and probity in the various provinces to receive the proceeds of the loan and to pay interest on it twice a year. As for the profits, I would have surrendered them all to the employees, contenting myself with a simple commission. My plan of conduct in the political world requires this renunciation of me, so that I might continue as I have done hitherto, making it impossible for my enemies to impute to me the motives by which they themselves act.

Nevertheless, sir, I beg you not to hasten your departure unduly.4 The affairs of the Republic are in a violent crisis. Time alone may in short order remove a great many of the aforementioned impediments. Congress itself can help a great deal by not leaving us, as it has done hitherto, without authentic information concerning the true state of America's affairs. It is on such information that all its credit depends. It will never acquire solidity in this country, as long as people here are not cured of their prejudices concerning America's weakness and in favor of the omnipotence of Great Britain. Congress should send small packet boats regularly once or twice a month, solely in order that the field might never be left uncontested to the English pamphleteers. When Henri IV had Maréchal de Biron arrested,5 he sent couriers all over Europe, whereas until now (so far as I know) the only accounts of Arnold's defection have been the surely exaggerated ones from the British ministry!

I fear that I am abusing your attention; but I cannot close without warning you to beware the jealousy that devours this country's merchants. Always discount to a degree whatever information you receive about them. I am 380certain that the success of the negotiation depends not so much, as some would have you believe, on the choice of the house which will assume the burden as on the aforementioned considerations. It is of no concern whatsoever to the lenders from whom they receive the contracts, duly signed in any event, and the interest. What concerns them more is that it should be as close as possible to their place of residence in order to avoid the costs of transportation. You know more about Mr. Tegelaar's business than I do. But if he be unsuitable (something of which I cannot judge), I see no objection to entrusting the enterprise to Mr. J. de Neufville. He has made large expenditures in the past. He has suffered losses, yet even with all that he began in commerce with a million florins. He has concluded some large affairs and is involved in even larger ones today. He is one of America's oldest and most zealous friends. He enjoys the confidence and consideration of the Regency of Amsterdam. The confidence that it showed by using him in this secret negotiation6 has given him prominence, which coupled with some minor imprudence on his part has earned him jealousy, and perhaps envy.

The house that would be the most natural to employ is Fizeaux and Grand. But the connection of the latter with an English general serving in America surely deserves reflection.7

As to the conduct of the English. I fear that their goal (apart from the general goal of diverting the Republic by means of innumerable negotiations and memorials) is to draw us into war before being admitted into the armed neutrality, in order to allow the confederated powers to refuse us for lacking the requisite qualification, namely, that of being a neutral power; or else, if they fail at that, to make war on us on the specious pretext of having violated neutrality through our correspondence with the rebels to the crown, so as to provide the leagued powers with a handle in order that, if they so wish or if the influence of the English so induces them, they may refuse us the stipulated assistance on the pretext of the non-existence of the casus foederis. The Republic, and even, according to reports, the Province of Holland, will shortly issue a formal disavowal of what the City of Amsterdam has done. That is all, I believe, that is within its power, for it is not within their strength to punish the accomplices of this plot. If, then, Mr. Yorke's memorial is not mere rodomontade, war is inevitable and a war quasi vero8 for a quarrel that is not within the purview of the armed neutrality. I hope to return to Amsterdam in three weeks, and in the meantime I remain, sir, with all possible respect, your most humble and obedient servant.

C——n de P——l

P.S. I take the liberty of sending you a copy of my speech or warning on the Scots' Brigade. The attached resolution of the States is but a small sample of the strange proceedings concerning me.9 It began with a dismantling of my speech and ended with a dismantling of my person, all without due process, and in matters where right, justice, equity, and duty were clearly on my side. They tried to legislate an example, and truly vestigia terrent!10

381

The garrison of this city was ordered last night to proceed to North Holland. It appears that the English threats have been apprehended!

May I ask you to convey my compliments to Monsieur Gillon and tell him that I received the letter and will communicate its contents tomorrow in person to my cousin, the Lord of Marsch.11

RC (Adams Papers); endorsed: “B. V. Copellen.”

1.

Pensées, but see van der Capellen's letter of 24 Dec., and note 1 (below).

2.

Although van der Capellen provides some information about JA's proposal, its exact nature is unknown. See JA's letter of 20 Nov., and note 2 (above).

3.

A reference to the documents captured with Henry Laurens, among which were letters from van der Capellen to Benjamin Franklin and Gov. Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut (from van der Capellen, 16 Oct., note 6, above).

4.

There had been no indication in JA's correspondence with van der Capellen or anyone else that he planned to leave the Netherlands.

5.

Charles de Gontaut, the Duc de Biron, one of Henry IV's most brilliant generals, was appointed maréchal de France by that monarch in 1594. In 1599 he entered into a secret agreement with Spain against Henry. In 1602 his treachery was discovered and he was arrested and beheaded for treason (Hoefer, Nouv. biog. générale ).

6.

The Lee-Neufville treaty.

7.

Chevalier George Grand was the father-in-law of Gen. Augustine Prevost, who had formerly been in East Florida and was currently commander of British troops in Georgia ( DNB , under Sir George Prevost; Mackesy, War for America , p. 267, 275, 277–278).

8.

That is, ostensibly.

9.

Van der Capellen enclosed a copy of his speech to the States of Overijssel of 16 Dec. 1775: Avis door Jonkheer Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol over het verzoek van zijne Majesteit den Koning van Groot-Brittanië, Raakende het leenen der Schotsche Brigade . . .; and possibly a copy of a resolution of 14 March 1777, by which the States of Overijssel removed van der Capellen's “Avis” from its records. The Scots' Brigade, originally comprised of Scotsmen and permanently quartered in the Netherlands, was a relic of British intervention in the Dutch Revolt. In 1775 Britain asked to borrow the brigade, which had been used in the past to augment the regular British army and seemed a logical source for additional troops for America. William V favored the request and the States General ultimately approved it, but with conditions that made the brigade's use in America impossible. On 16 Dec. 1775, as the States of Overijssel considered its position on the British request, van der Capellen made an impassioned speech in opposition, arguing that allowing the brigade to depart would not only compromise Dutch neutrality, but also be serving an unjust cause: Britain's denial of American independence. The speech did not sway the States of Overijssel, which approved the British request, but it did establish van der Capellen as the highest ranking Dutch supporter of the American Revolution in opposition to the Stadholder and the Dutch establishment (Schulte Nordholt, Dutch Republic and Amer. Independence , p. 19–21, 25–26; Edler, Dutch Republic and the American Revolution , p. 28–33).

10.

Literally, they feared the footprints, but van der Capellen presumably means that the States of Overijssel feared the future that he represented.

11.

Robert Jasper van der Capellen tot de Marsch. The nature of Gillon's business is not known.