Papers of John Adams, volume 5

From William Tudor, 6 September 1776 Tudor, William JA

1776-09-06

From William Tudor, 6 September 1776 Tudor, William Adams, John
From William Tudor
Dr Sir New York 6th. Sepr. 76

I am exceedingly concerned to find that the New Articles of War, though passed, are not to take Place yet.1 The infamous Desertions, the Shameless Ravages, and seditious Speeches and mutinous Behaviour which prevail throughout your Army, call in the loudest Language for a Reform. With the present Articles, the military Government, without making Soldiers, is breeding Highwaymen and Robbers. As to the Militia that are here, they are only an armed Rabble. And indeed all Troops who are without Discipline are such. To inlist an army, without that Severity of Government which will alone make Soldiers, is to collect Numbers only to be slaughtered. But it is not enough that we have Severity in the Government. Officers and Men must make a Business of fighting, and the latter pursue it as a Livelihood. I hope in God that the Short Inlistment of the present Army may not prove our Destruction.2 This is certain that if Congress does not raise an Army for 3 Years or during the Contest, all the best Officers in the Service will quit it. There is even at this very critical Juncture a most scandalous Relaxation in the Discipline in most of the Continental Regiments. And the Reason is, that the Time of Inlistment is almost expired, and the Officers think that if they shew any Severity, the Men will not again inlist. Had we been so wise as to have engaged the Men at first in the Service during the War, we should now have had an Army to have met British Troops on an equal footing. Now—the Disparity is so great, I fear an Attack will be a Defeat. As to having Recourse to a Militia, it is a most wretched Subterfuge, it is worse than 14Nothing, because it is taking Men who might be useful at home, and bringing and supporting them at a vast Expence in a Scene where they are useless.3 For Experience has demonstrated they will not stand Fire. They may defend their own Farms and Houses, but a Militia will not fight from home. Men Must be gradually train'd to War, and learn to fight as they learn any Thing else.

If You would have an Army to depend upon, You must inlist them for three Years at least, and to engage them so long a handsome Bounty must be offered. Each Regiment should have a Man of Sense and Honor to command it, a spirited and indefatigable Major and Adjutant, and each Company two good Sargents at least. It is the Non commissioned Officers chiefly who train and make British Soldiers what they are. The Officers are inquiring whether Congress don't mean to have an Army next Year. If they do—surely it is Time to set about inlisting one. Many People imagine if the Army here is defeated, America is conquered. I am of a very different Opinion; I think a sound Beating will be of Service to Us, and we at Length learn to beat Britons, as the Russians did the Swedes, though I hope not at so dear a Rate. We much want General Officers. And I know of no Officer more essential in the Formation of an Army than the Adjutant General. He ought to be completely vers'd in the Routine of military Duty: thoroughly acquainted with the Details and Arrangement of an Army; sensible, prompt and indefatigable, well skill'd in military Science, and an old Soldier. Such a Man Congress might have employ'd, but they did not, and the Brigade Majors and Adjutants who are Young and look up to an Adjutant General for Directions feel the Want. The Loss of General Gates is Universally acknowleged throughout the Army.4

The Character you have drawn of a General Officer may perhaps have been exhibited by, a Turenne, Eugene, Marborough or Saxe,5 but no Country can boast such a one now. We have an exceeding good Commander in Chief, who though he may approach nearer the Character of Fabius than of Hannibal, is not wanting in Intrepidity or the truest Patriotism; I pity his Situation and wish him more able Counsellors and spirited Assistants.

Let me earnestly (through You) intreat Congress to forward the New Articles that we may check the dayly Villainies which now escape Punishment, or next to it, from the Lenity of the 15present Set. Be Assured Sir that our Men have in a great Measure lost that Virtue which first engaged them to fight, their Enthusiasm is fast wearing off, and they are sinking into an Army of Mercenaries. And as they are not to be restrained by a Sense of Honour or of Duty, pray make them governable by a Fear of Punishment. I am very sincerely yours

Pray write me, Dear Sir, as often as You can. I will return the Favour. And endeavour in future to atone for my past Neglect. The Removal of the Post Office 30 miles from York,6 will disappoint me of Conveyance that Way.

RC (Adams Papers); docketed: “Tudor”; docketed in another hand: “W Tudor Sept 6. 1776.”

1.

On the basis of a report from the Board of War, the congress began considering revision of the Articles of War on 7 Aug., but did not complete its work until 20 Sept. ( JCC , 5:636, 788–807). The need for revision was an old story for Tudor, who was judge advocate. In the fall of 1775 he had successfully called for changes in the original articles, and in the early summer of 1776 he pressed for further revisions (Tudor to JA, 7 July, vol. 4:367).

2.

In the scheme for the “new army,” adopted by the congress on 4 Nov. 1775, enlistments were to run from 1 Jan. 1776 till the end of that year. On 26 June 1776 the congress offered a bounty of ten dollars for those who would enlist for three years, a bounty regarded by army leaders as wholly insufficient ( JCC , 3:324; 5:483).

3.

At the time of the Battle of Long Island only 25 of Washington's 71 regiments, not all of them complete, were Continental units. Tudor's sweeping statement about the uselessness of the militia does an injustice to some state troops. Militiamen from Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland under Lord Stirling's direction and others from Pennsylvania and Connecticut under Gen. Parsons fought vigorously and courageously in the battle (Johnston, Campaign around New York and Brooklyn , p. 124, 166–172). It is true, however, that after the battle many militiamen returned home without authorization, suffering from discouragement and lack of pay (Freeman, Washington , 4:180).

4.

Joseph Reed became adjutant general shortly after Gates was promoted to major general and given a field command.

5.

Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, and Hermann-Maurice, comte de Saxe, were marshals of France, the one during the Thirty Years War (1630–1648), the other during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, English general, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, commander of Austrian troops, distinguished themselves in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) (Hoefer, Nouv. biog. générale ; DNB ).

6.

That is, New York.

From Joseph Ward, 6 – 12 September 1776 Ward, Joseph JA

From Joseph Ward, 6 – 12 September 1776 Ward, Joseph Adams, John
From Joseph Ward
Sir Boston September 6, 1776

I have the honour of your Letter of the 20th of August.1 Agreeable to your desire have inclosed a Return of the Continental armed Vessels fitted out in this State.

If the two grateful Brothers 2 should pay us a visit, I will omit nothing in my power to give them a reception suitable to their 16gratitude. And if they should not bring too much Company with them I should be glad to wait on them.

I thank you Sir, for the many just remarks in your Letter; your firm attachment to the Rights of your Country and your Abilities to support them I know well, and therefore your Sentiments have singular weight with me; if at any time they do not carry conviction, they always demand my serious attention.

Far be it from me to derogate from the merits of the celebrated General;3 he has great merit and deserves the esteem of his Country. I believe he fills the rank he now holds with dignity, and that it was wise to appoint him to the command of the Troops of his own State; but from hence I think it does not follow that he ought to command our Troops in preference to our Officers;4 for with all his accomplishments he wanted one (if I am not misinformed) which many of our Officers had, that is, tried courage and approved abilities in the field of battle. This is an essential and capital article to compleat a Solders character. Not that I doubt his courage or abilities in Action, but there will always be a difference between real proof and the strongest presumption; and our presumption in cases of this kind oftener deceive us than in any other. I know, Sir, an Officer of rank, who was esteemed by the principal Gentlemen of his Colony the first military character in it, and I was told by one of those Gentlemen who was celebrated for his superior abilities, that they placed their chief dependence upon this Officer as a man of fighting talents—yet since that time I have been informed from the best authority, 'That the people in his own Province have not much Confidence in their own Generals.'5

If there was weight in the reasons urged by the Gentlemen here for a Southern General to be first in command, those reasons I conceive could not apply to the second with any degree of force. And Sir, if both those Gentlemen had been sent here, not-withstanding their merit, it would infallibly have dishonoured this State in the Eyes of America; it would have been an acknowledgement, and by “the principal Gentlemen,” that we had not Officers fit to command our own men in defence of our own State. Is this the character of Massachusetts? Then who would not weep that he was born here! A State once venerable for her wise and martial Sons, but now her departed glory and degenerate children call for the tear of pity and lamentation.

I have long known, to my sorrow, that many of the people of 17our own State have not much confidence in our own Generals. I have long been sensible of the cause and have laboured to the utmost of my influence to remove it. There is a ridiculous weakness in many men more especially the Citizens, which inclines them to prefer every foreign commodity to the superior productions of their own State; this superlative folly induces them to bewray their own nest. Men in this State are not without imperfections, but I conceive they are equal to any of the Sons of Adam.

You know Sir, the first General in this State6 entered the service under the great disadvantage of bad health, which cast a gloom over his mind, and this in fact has clouded his whole administration. This circumstance has cost me more Care labour and concern than can easily be imagined. I have done all in my power to promote the honour of his command and to turn the bright side to the day; if that will not bear the light I cannot help it. He certainly has many Virtues and qualifications to form the General, and had he been in high health he would have made a very different figure.

A General should have popular talents, be active and enterprising, free from gloom or despondency, and by an uniform air and conduct shew the Army that he is superior to difficulties dangers or misfortunes; this never fails to inspire the men and gain their esteem and confidence. In some of these particulars perhaps our Generals may have been wanting. A compleat General is a great and a singular character, it is I believe the rarest in the world.

You are pleased to ask who among the Colonels are most fit for Generals. I can better answer this question a few days hence, after their conduct at New York shall be tried. I have been told that Col Jonathan Brewer7 has been talked of for a General, but I trust he never will be appointed, for he is so unpopular he could not fill up his Regiment, neither Officers nor privates like to be under his command; for although he has some military talents he has so many vices that it might be dangerous to advance him.

I apprehend that the public good requires that the line of succession should not be an invariable rule of promotion, for the best men do not always stand first. If a few old Colonels should resign it might be no disadvantage to the Service; very few of them take much pains to qualify themselves for higher command; they want education, knowledge of the World and gen-18uine ambition to make them shine as Generals. I apprehend that Benjamin Lincoln Esqr. (now a Major General in the militia) is a good man for a Brigadire General; he has never been a Continental Officer nor had much experience, but he is a man of abilities and appears to me to have a good mind.8 I am well informed that he would like to engage in the Service.

With regard to myself, I assure you Sir, did not a view to the public interest prompt me to continue in the Army more than any private considerations I should long since thought of leaving it, for personal interest or honour is not a motive sufficient with me to indure the fatigues and dangers of war; nothing but principles that will do for a man to “carry with him,” will support the mind with true dignity when the arrows of death fly so thick he hardly knows which world he belongs to. Nothing but the scarcity of men fit for command induces me to think of it. I have served a short apprenticeship with Generals, and know the burden of command; but as there is not a Colonel in the Army who is acquainted with the various duties of this Department, I was willing to accept the command here. I suppose the reason why General Whetcomb did not accept was his being unacquainted with the duties to be performed; but as he is an active good man I am sorry he did not accept, I would willingly have served as an assistant to him, knowing him to be a worthy character by experience, in the first of the war.

If Succession is to be the rule of promotion, and you begin the line at the commencement of this War, I am of right before every Colonel in the Army, as I was appointed to my present Rank before either of them had any appointment at all, and was in service and Action before any of them, consequently I must rank before them. It cannot be supposed that I have lost my original priority by continuing in my first appointment in order to do more extensive services, and it is well known to every man who was acquainted with the business at Head Quarters, the first months of the war, that my duty was more than double to a Colonels. It is also well known that it was so easy to obtain a Regiment in the first formation of the Army, that some without many civil or military accomplishments, or even the accidental circumstance of family or fortune, got a Regiment; and therefore I might suppose, as I was so early engaged in the service, that a Regiment was my right, and was attainable.

There are a number of Colonels who came into the service long 19after me; one who commanded a Company last year now commands a Regiment; can it be supposed that all these are to stand in the way of my rising to a command superior to theirs, not-withstanding I was their superior, because they now have a Regiment? If so, my extra services instead of raising will degrade me.

The rank of an Aid de Camp in our Army has never been settled, but in my appointment it is ordered, “that all Orders coming from the General by an Aid de Camp whether written or verbal are to be forthwith obeyed,” and as discretionary orders are often given he has the direction of Colonels in many cases.

Pardon my prolixity upon a subject of so little importance, so far as it relates to myself, and permit me to assure You, Sir, that I never wish any of my Friends should think of my promotion but with a view to serve my Country; for nothing could make me more unhappy than to be advanced to the injury of the public, and (consequently), to the dishonour of my Friends. I should not have wrote a line upon this subject, but with this view, that if at any time it should be thought that I might serve my Country, the objection with regard to Colonels might not stand in the way; or at least that it may be viewed in a just light. However I trust that I shall always think it my duty to submit to the Decisions of Congress with a “respectful silence.”

12 September

This morning General Ward returned from Worcester, where he has been for near a fortnight upon public business in that County; he will I believe comply with the Request of Congress, and continue his Command some time longer until there are further operations at New York. Our affairs in that Quarter do not wear so agreeable an aspect as we wish, however I trust they will terminate well. We are informed that some Members of Congress are to have a conference with the two grateful Brothers, and that You are to attend the conference. I trust you will easily see through the designs of those Wretches, and let them know the States of America are too sensible of their own dignity and importance to listen to any propositions that are inconsistent with the freedom and glory of America.

RC (Adams Papers); enclosure not found.

1.

Vol. 4:478.

2.

JA's name for Richard and William Howe, who were ungrateful for the honor Massachusetts did their older brother, George Augustus. See vol. 3:33, note 3.

3.

Ward, angry over JA's apparent con-20tempt for Massachusetts military leaders, refers ironically to Gen. Thomas Mifflin, whose promotion to general Ward had questioned and JA defended at some length. At Mifflin's own request, he was allowed to give up his post as quartermaster general in order to command Pennsylvania troops in New York. He led them to Long Island after the battle and then reputedly advised Washington that the Americans must retreat from the island ( DAB ; Johnston, Campaign around New York and Brooklyn , p. 208, 216, note).

4.

Earlier JA had hoped to have both Gens. Gates and Mifflin sent to Boston to assume command (vol. 4:187).

5.

A paraphrase of JA's words. He was the Massachusetts leader “celebrated for his superior abilities,” and the general was probably John Thomas. See JA to Ward, 20 Aug. (vol. 4:478–479).

6.

Artemas Ward.

7.

Brewer commanded a Massachusetts regiment of artificers (Heitman, Register Continental Army , p. 119).

8.

In Feb. 1777 Lincoln was named a major general in the Continental Army (same, p. 351).