Papers of John Adams, volume 2

VIII. (cont.). To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, 20 March 1775 JA Novanglus Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay Colony Massachusettensis

1775-03-20

VIII. (cont.). To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, 20 March 1775 Adams, John Novanglus Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay Colony Massachusettensis
VIII. (cont.). To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay
20 March 1775 Remainder of the NOVANGLUS begun in our last.

Wales was a little portion of the island of Great-Britain, which the Saxons were never able to conquer. The Britons had reserved this tract of land to themselves and subsisted wholly by pasturage, among their mountains. Their princes however, during the Norman period, and untill the reign of king Edward the first, did homage to the crown of England, as their feudal sovereign, in the same manner as the prince of one independant state in Europe frequently did to the sovereign of another. This little principality of shepherds and cowherds, had however maintained their independence, through long and bloody wars against the omnipotence of England, for 800 years. It is needless to enumerate the causes of the war between Lewellyn and Edward the first. It is sufficient to say that the Welch prince refused to go to England to do homage, and Edward obtained a new aid of a fifteenth from his parliament, to march with a strong force into Wales. Edward was joined by David and Roderic, two brothers of Lewellyn, who made a strong party among the Welch themselves, to assist and second the attempts to enslave their native country. The English monarch however, with all these advantages, was afraid to put the valour of his enemies to a tryal, and trusted to the slow effects of famine to subdue them. Their pasturage, with such an enemy in their country, could not subsist them, and Lewellyn 19 Nov. 1277 at last submitted; and bound himself to pay a reparation of damages: to do homage to the crown of England, and almost to surrender his independence as a Prince by permitting all the other Barons of Wales, excepting four, to swear fealty to the same crown. But fresh complaints soon arose: The English grew insolent on their bloodless victory, and oppressed the inhabitants—many insults were offered, which at last raised the indignation of the Welch, so that they determined again to take arms, rather than bear any longer the oppression of the haughty victors. The war raged, some time, until Edward summoned all his military tenants, and advanced with an army too powerful for the Welch to resist. Lewellyn was at last surprized, by Edward's 338General Mortimer, and fighting at a great disadvantage was slain with two thousand of his men. David, who succeeded in the principality, maintained the war for some time, but at last was betrayed to the enemy, sent in Chains to Shrewsbury, brought to a formal trial before the peers of England, and altho' a sovereign prince, ordered by Edward to be hanged, drawn and quartered, as a traitor, for defending by arms the liberties of his native country! All the Welch nobility submitted to the conqueror: The laws of England, sheriffs, and other ministers of justice, were established in that principality, which had maintained its liberties and independency, 800 years.

Now Wales was always part of the dominions of England: “Wales was always feudatory to the kingdom of England.”1 It was always held of the crown of England, or the kingdom of England: that is, whoever was king of England, had a right to homage, &c. from the prince of Wales. But yet Wales was not parcel of the realm or kingdom, nor bound by the laws of England. I mention and insist upon this, because it shews, that altho' the colonies are bound to the crown of England, or in other words, owe allegiance to whomsoever is king of England; yet it does not follow that the colonies are parcel of the realm or kingdom, and bound by its laws. As this is a point of great importance, I must beg pardon, however unentertaining it may be, to produce my authorities.

Comyns digest. v. 5. page 626. “Wales was always feudatory to the kingdom of England.

“Held of the crown but not parcel. Per Cook Coke. 1 Roll. 247–2 Roll. 29.2 And therefore the kings of Wales did homage, and swore fealty to H. 2. and John and H. 3.

“And ii Ed. 1. Upon the conquest of Lewellyn prince or king of Wales that principality became a part of the dominion of the realm of England. And by the statute Walliae 12 Ed. 1. it was annexed and united to the crown of England, tanquam partem corporis ejusdem,3 &c.—Yet, if the statute Walliae, made at Rutland 12 Ed. 1. was not an act of parliament (as it seems that it was not) the incorporation made thereby was only an union jure feudali, et non jure proprietatis.” 4

“Wales before the union with England was governed by its own proper laws.” &c.

By these authorities it appears, that Wales was subject by the feudal law, to the crown of England, before the conquest of Lewellyn; but not subject to the laws of England: and indeed after this 339conquest, Edward, and his nobles, did not seem to think it subject to the English parliament, but to the will of the king as a conqueror of it in war. Accordingly that instrument which is called Statutum Walliae, and to be found in the appendix to the statutes page 3, altho' it was made by the advice of the peers, or officers of the army more properly, yet it never was passed as an act of parliament, but as an edict of the king. It begins not in the style of an act of parliament. Edwardus dei gratia Rex Angliae, Dominus Hyberniae, et Dux Aquitaniae, omnibus fidelibus suis, &c. in Wallia. Divina providentia, quae in sui dispositione, says he, nonfallitur, inter alia dispensations suae munera, quibus nos et Regnum nostram Angliae decorare dignata est, terram Walliae, cum incolis suis, prius nobis jure feudali subjectam, jam sui gratia, in proprietatis nostrae dominium, obstaculis quibuscumque cessantibus, totalliter, et cum integritate convertit, et coronae regni praedicti, tanquam partem corporis ejusdem annexuit et univit.5

Here is the most certain evidence that Wales was subject to the kings of England by the feudal law before the conquest, tho' not bound by any laws but their own. 2. That the conquest was considered, in that day, as conferring the property as well as jurisdiction of Wales to the English crown. 3. The conquest was considered as annexing and uniting Wales to the English crown, both in point of property and jurisdiction, as a part of one body. Yet notwithstanding all this, parliament was not considered as acquiring any share in the government of Wales by this conquest. If then, it should be admitted that the colonies are all annexed and united to the crown of England, it will not follow that Lords and Commons have any authority over them.

This statutum Walliae, as well as the whole case and history of that principality, is well worthy of the attention and study of Americans, because it abounds, with evidence, that a country may be subject to the crown of England, without being subject to the Lords and Commons of that realm, which entirely overthrows the whole argument of Governor Hutchinson and of Massachusettensis in support of the supreme authority of parliament, over all the dominions of the imperial crown. “Nos itaque,” &c. says King Ed. 1. “volentes predictam terram, &c. sicut et caeteras ditioni nostrae subjectas, &c. sub-340debito regimine gubernari, et incolas seu habitatores terarum illarum, qui alto et basso, Se submiserunt voluntati nostrae, et quos sic ad nostram recepimus voluntatem, certis legibus et consuetudinibus, &c. tractari Leges, et consuetudines, partum illarum hactenus usitatas coram nobis et proceribus regni nostri secimus necitari, quibus diligenter auditas, et plenus intellectis, quasdam ipsarum de concilio procerum predictorum delevimus, quasdampertmisimus, et quasdam correximus, et etiam quasdam alias adjungendas et statuendas decrevimus, et eas, &c. observari volumus in forma subscripta.” 6

And then goes on to prescribe and establish a whole code of laws for the principality, in the style of a sole legislator, and concludes,

Et ideo vobis mandamus, quod premissa de cetero in omnibus firmiter observetis. Ita tamen quod quotiescunque, et quandocunque, et ubicunque, nobis placuerit, possimus predicta statuta et coram partes singulas declarare, interpretari, addere sive diminuere, pro nostro libito voluntatis, et prout securitati nostrae et tense, nostrae predictae viderimus expedire.7

Here is then a conquered people submitting, to a system of laws framed by the mere will of the conqueror, and agreeing to be forever governed by his mere will. This absolute monarch then might afterwards govern this country, with or without the advice of his English lords and commons.

To shew that Wales was held before the conquest of Lewellyn, of the king of England, altho' governed by its own laws, hear lord Coke, 2 Inst. 194, in his commentary on the statute of Westminster. “At this time viz. in 3. Ed. 1. Lewellyn was a prince or king of Wales, who held the same of the king of England, as his superior lord, and owed him liege homage and fealty; and this is proved by our act, viz. that the king of England was superior dominus, i.e. sovereign lord of the kingdom or principality of Wales.”

341

Lord Coke in 4 Inst. 239. says “Wales was sometime a realm, or kingdom (realm from the French word royaume, and both a regno) and governed per suas regulas,” and afterwards, “but jure feudali, the kingdom of Wales was holden of the crown of England, and thereby as Bracton saith, was sub potestate regis. And so it continued until the 11 year of king E. 1. when he subdued the prince of Wales, rising against him, and executed him for treason.” “The next year, viz. in the 12 year of king E. 1. by authority of parliament, it is declared thus, speaking in the person of the king (as ancient statutes were wont to do) divina providentia,” &c. as in the statute Walliae before recited. But here is an inaccuracy for the statutum Walliae, was not an act of parliament, but made by the king with the advice of his officers of the army, by his sole authority, as the statute itself sufficiently shews. Note, says Lord Coke, “diverse monarchs hold their kingdoms of others jure feudali, as the duke of Lombardy, Cicill, Naples, and Bohemia of the empire, Granado, Leons, of Aragon, Navarre, Portugal of Castile. And so others.”

After this the Welsh seem to have been fond of the English laws, and desirous of being incorporated into the realm, to be represented in parliament, and enjoy all the rights of Englishmen, as well as to be bound by the English laws. But Kings were so fond of governing this principality by their discretion alone, that they never could obtain these blessings until the reign of Henry the Eighth, and then they only could obtain a statute, which enabled the king to alter their laws at his pleasure. They did indeed obtain in the 15 Ed. 2. a writ, to call 24 members to the parliament at York from south Wales, and twenty four from North Wales, and again in the 20 Ed. 2, the like number of 48 members for Wales, at the parliament of Westminster. But lord Coke tells us “that this wise and warlike nation was long after, the statutum Walliae not satisfied nor contented, and especially, for that they truly and constantly took part with their rightful sovereign and liege lord, king Richard the second; in revenge whereof they had many severe and invective laws made against them in the reigns of H. 4, H. 5, &c. all which as unjust are repealed and abrogated. And to say the truth, this nation was never in quiet, until king H. 7, their own countryman obtained the crown. And yet not so really reduced in his time, as in the reign of his son H. 8, in whose time certain just laws, made at the humble suit of the subjects of Wales, the principality and dominion of Wales was incorporated and united to the realm of England; and enacted that every one born in Wales, should enjoy the liberties, rights and laws of this realm, as any subjects naturally 342born within this realm should have and inherit, and that they should have knights of shires, and burgesses of parliament.” Yet we see they could not obtain any security for their liberties, for lord Coke tells us, “in the act of 34. H. 8. it was enacted, that the king's most royal majesty should from time to time change, &c. all manner of things in that act rehearsed, as to his most excellent wisdom and discretion should be thought convenient, and also to make laws and ordinances for the commonwealth of his said dominion, of Wales at his majesty's pleasure.” But for that, the subjects of the dominion of Wales, &c. had lived in all dutiful subjection to the crown of England, &c. the said branch of the said statute of 34. H. 8. is repealed, and made void by 21 Jac. 1 c. 10.

But if we look into the statute itself of 27. H. 8 c. 26, we shall find the clearest proof that being subject to the imperial crown of England, did not intitle Welchmen to the liberties of England, nor make them subject to the laws of England. “Albeit the dominion, principality and country of Wales justly and righteously is, and ever hath been incorporated, annexed, united, and subject to and under the imperial crown of this realm, as a very member and joint of the same; wherefore, the king's most royal majesty of mere droit, and very right, is very head, king, lord and ruler; yet, notwithstanding, because that in the same country, principality and dominion, diverse rights, usages, laws and customs be far discrepant from the laws and customs of this realm, &c. Wherefore it is enacted, by king, lords and commons,” that “his” (i.e. the king's) said country or dominion of Wales shall be, stand and continue for ever from henceforth, incorporated, united, and annexed to and with this, his realm of England; and that all and singular person and persons, born or to be born, in the said principality, country, or dominion of Wales, shall have, enjoy, and inherit, all and singular freedoms, liberties, rights, privileges, and laws, within this his realm, and other the king's dominions, as other the king's subjects naturally born within the same have, enjoy, and inherit.” § 2. enacts that the laws of England shall be introduced and established in Wales: and that the laws, ordinances and statutes of this realm of England, forever and none other shall be used and practiced, forever thereafter in the said dominion of Wales. The 27th § of this long statute enacts, that commissioners shall enquire into the laws and customs of Wales, and report to the king, who with his privy council, are impowered to establish such of them as they should think proper. § 28 enacts that in all future parliaments for this realm, two knights for the shire of 343Monmouth and one burgess for the town, shall be chosen, and allowed such fees as other knights and burgesses of parliament were allowed. § 29 enacts, that one knight shall be elected for every shire within the country or dominion of Wales, and one burgess for every shire town, to serve in that and every future parliament to be holden for this realm. But by § 36 the king is impowered to revoke, repeal and abrogate that whole act, or any part of it, at any time within three years.

Upon this statute let it be observed 1. That the language of Massachusettensis “imperial crown” is used in it: and Wales is affirmed to have ever been annexed, and united to that imperial crown, as a very member and joint: which shews that being annexed to the imperial crown, does not annex a country to the realm, or make it subject to the authority of parliament: because Wales, certainly before the conquest of Lewellyn never was pretended to be so subject, nor afterwards ever pretended to be annexed to the realm, at all, nor subject to the authority of parliament, any otherwise than as the king claimed to be absolute in Wales, and therefore to make laws for it, by his mere will, either with the advice of his proceres, or without. 2. That Wales never was incorporated with the realm of England, until this statute was made, nor subject to any authority of English lords and commons. 3. That the king was so tenacious of his exclusive power over Wales that he would not consent to this statute, without a clause in it, to retain the power in his own hands of giving it what system of law he pleased. 4. That knights and burgesses, i.e. representatives, were considered as essential and fundamental in the constitution of the new legislature, which was to govern Wales. 5. That since this statute, the distinction between the realm of England and the realm of Wales, has been abolished, and the realm of England, now, and ever since, comprehends both; so that Massachusettensis is mistaken, when he says, that the realm of England is an appropriate term for the ancient realm of England, in contradistinction from Wales, &c. 6. That this union and incorporation was made by the consent, and upon the supplication of the people of Wales, as Lord Coke, and many other authors inform us, so that here was an express contract between the two bodies of people. To these observations, let me add a few questions.

Was there ever any act of parliament, annexing, uniting, and consolidating any one of all the colonies to and with the realm of England or the kingdom of Great-Britain? 2. If such an act of parliament should be made, would it upon any principles of English laws and 344government, have any validity, without the consent, petition or supplication of the colonies? 3. Can such an union and incorporation, ever be made, upon any principles of English laws and government, without admitting representatives for the colonies in the house of commons, and American lords into the house of peers? 4. Would not representatives in the house of commons, unless they were numerous in proportion to the numbers of people in America, be a snare rather than a blessing? 5. Would Britain ever agree to a proportionable number of American members, and if she would, could America support the expence of them? 6. Could American representatives, possibly know the sense, the exigencies, &c. of their constituents, at such a distance, so perfectly as it is absolutely necessary legislators should know? 7. Could Americans ever come to the knowledge of the behaviour of their members, so as to dismiss the unworthy? 8. Would Americans in general, ever submit to septennial elections? 9. Have we not sufficient evidence, in the general frailty and depravity of human nature, and especially the experience we have had of Massachusettensis and the junto, that a deep, treacherous, plausible, corrupt minister, would be able to seduce our Members to betray us, as fast as we could send them?

To return to Wales: In the statute of 34 and 35 of Henry 8. c. 26. We find a more compleat system of laws and regulations for Wales. But the king is still tenacious of his absolute authority over it. It begins “our sovereign lord the king, of his tender zeal and affection, &c. to his obedient subjects, &c. of Wales, &c. hath devised and made divers sundry good and necessary ordinances, which his majesty of his most abundant goodness, at the humble suit and petition of his said subjects of Wales, is pleased and contented to be enacted by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, &c.”

Nevertheless, the king would not yet give up his unlimited power over Wales, for by the 119 § of this statute—the king, &c. may at all times hereafter, from time to time, change, add, alter, order, minish and reform all manner of things afore rehearsed, as to his most excellent wisdom and discretion, shall be thought convenient; and also to make laws and ordinances for the common wealth and good quiet of his said dominion of Wales, and his subjects of the same, from time to time, at his majesty's pleasure.

And this last section was never repealed, until the 21. Jac. 1. c. 10. §. 4.

From the conquest of Lewellyn to this statute of James is near 350 years during all which time, the Welch were very fond of being 345incorporated and enjoying the English laws, the English were desirous that they should be; yet the crown would never suffer it to be compleatly done, because it claimed an authority to rule it by discretion: It is conceived, therefore that there cannot be a more compleat and decisive proof of any thing, than this instance is, that a country may be subject to the crown of England, the imperial crown; and yet not annexed to the realm, or subject to the authority of parliament.

The word crown, like the word throne, is used in various figurative senses, sometimes it means the kingly office, the head of the common wealth, but it does not always mean the political capacity of the king—much less does it include in the idea of it lords and commons. It may as well be pretended that the house of commons includes or implies a king. Nay it may as well be pretended, that the mace includes the three branches of the legislature.

By the feudal law, a person or a country might be subject to a king, a feudal sovereign, three several ways.

1. It might be subject to his person, and in this case, it would continue so subject, let him be where he would, in his dominions or without. 2. To his crown, and in this case subjection was due, to whatsoever person or family, wore that crown, and would follow it, whatever revolutions it underwent. 3. To his crown and realm or state, and in this case it was incorporated, as one body with the principal kingdom, and if that was bound by a parliament, diet, or cortes, so was the other.

It is humbly conceived, that the subjection of the colonies by compact, and law is of the second sort.

Suffer me, my friends, to conclude by making my most respectful compliments to the gentlemen of the regiment of royal Welch fusileers.8 In the celebration of their late festival, they discover'd that they are not insensible of the feelings of a man for his native country. The most generous minds are the most exquisitely capable of this sentiment. Let me intreat them to recollect the history of their brave and intrepid countrymen, who struggled at least 1100 years for liberty. Let them compare the case of Wales with the case of America, and then lay their hands upon their hearts and say, whether we can in justice be bound by all acts of parliament, without being incorporated with the kingdom.

NOVANGLUS
1.

Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England, 5:626. This quotation when repeated below is followed by three paragraphs from Comyns.

2.

Henry Rolle, Abridgement of the Common Law.

3.

As part of the body of the same.

4.

By feudal right, not by right of property.

5.

Edward by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland and Duke of Aquitaine to all his subjects &c. in Wales [Greeting]. The divine providence, which is unerring in its government, among other gifts of its dispensation, wherewith it has vouchsafed to distinguish us and our realm of England, has now, all obstacles having been overcome, of its favor wholly and entirely transferred under our dominion the land of Wales, with its inhabitants, heretofore subject to us in feudal right, and has annexed and united the same unto the crown of the aforesaid realm, as a part of the same body.

6.

We therefore &c. being desirous that the aforesaid land &c. like others subject to our power, should be governed with due order, as that the people or inhabitants of those lands who have submitted themselves absolutely to our will, and whom we have so accepted, should be treated under fixed laws and customs, we have caused to be rehearsed before us and the magnates of our realm the laws and customs hitherto in use in those parts, which being carefully heard as fully understood we have, with the advice of the aforesaid magnates, abolished some of them, allowed some and corrected some. We have also commanded certain others to be added and ordained and these &c. we wish to be observed in the form underwritten.

7.

We therefore order you that from henceforth you steadfastly observe them completely. In such a way that whensoever and as often as it shall be our pleasure, we may declare, interpret, enlarge, or diminish the aforesaid statutes and the several parts of them, according to our free will and as to us shall seem expedient for the security of us and our lands aforesaid.

8.

The 23d Regiment of Foot, or Royal Welsh Fusiliers, came to New York in 3461773 and in the following year were transferred to Boston to help Gen. Gage enforce the Coercive Acts in Massachusetts (Gage, Corr. , 2:639; John Shy, Toward Lexington, Princeton, 1965, p. 398, 413).

IX. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, 27 March 1775 JA Novanglus Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay Colony Massachusettensis

1775-03-27

IX. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, 27 March 1775 Adams, John Novanglus Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay Colony Massachusettensis
IX. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay
My Friends, 27 March 1775

Massachusettensis, in some of his writings has advanced, that our allegiance is due to the political capacity of the King, and therefore involves in it obedience to the British parliament. Governor Hutchinson in his memorable speech laid down the same position. I have already shewn from the case of Wales, that this position is groundless—and that allegiance was due from the Welch to the King, jure feodali, before the conquest of Lewellyn, and after that to the Crown, until it was annexed to the realm, without being subject to acts of parliament any more than to acts of the King, without parliament. I shall hereafter shew from the case of Ireland, that subjection to the Crown implies no obedience to parliament. But before I come to this, I must take notice of a pamphlet, intitled, “A candid Examination of the mutual claims of Great-Britain and the colonies, with a plan of accommodation on constitutional principles.”1 This author, p. 8, says “to him (i.e. the King) in this representative capacity, and as supreme executor of the laws, made by a joint power of him and others, the oaths of allegiance are taken”, and afterwards, “Hence these professions (i.e. of allegiance) are not made to him either in his legislative, or executive capacities; but yet it seems they are made to the King. And into this distinction, which is no where to be found either in the constitution of the government, in reason or common sense, the ignorant and thoughtless have been deluded ever since the passing of the stamp act, and they have rested satisfied with it without the least examination.” And in p. 9, he says, “I do not mean to offend the inventers of this refined distinction, when I ask them 'is this acknowledgment made to the king, in his politick capacity as king of “Great Britain, &c.” if so, it includes a promise of obedience to the British laws.'” There is no danger of this gentleman's giving offence to the inventers of this distinction, for they have been many centuries in their graves. This distinction is to be found every where: in the case of Wales, Ireland and elsewhere, as I shall shew most abundantly before I have done. It is to be found in two of the greatest cases and most deliberate and solemn judgments that were 347ever passed. One of them is Calvin's case, 7 Rep.2—which as lord Coke tells us, was as elaborately, substantially and judiciously argued, as he ever heard, or read of any. After it had been argued in the court of king's bench, by learned council, it was adjourned to the exchequer chamber, and there argued again, first by council on both sides and then by the lord chancellor and all the twelve judges of England, and among these were the greatest men, that Westminster hall ever could boast. Ellismore Ellesmere, Bacon, Hide Hyde, Hobart, Crook Croke, and Coke,3 were all among them. And the chancellor and judges were unanimous in resolving. What says the book? 7 rep. 10. “Now seeing the king hath but one person, and several capacities, and one politick capacity for the realm of England, and another for the realm of Scotland, it is necessary to be considered, to which capacity ligeance is due. And it was resolved that it was due to the natural person of the king (which is ever accompanied with the politick capacity, and the politick capacity as it were appropriated to the natural capacity) and it is not due to the politick capacity only, that is, to the crown or kingdom, distinct from his natural capacity.” And further on 7 rep. 11. “But it was clearly resolved by all the judges, that presently by the descent his majesty was compleatly and absolutely king,” &c. and that coronation was but a royal ornament! 6. b. 4 “In the reign of Ed. 2d, the Spencers, to cover the treason hatched in their hearts, invented this damnable and damned opinion, that homage and oath of allegiance was more by reason of the king's crown (that is of his politick capacity) than by reason of the person of the king, upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestible consequences.” And afterwards, 12. “Where books and acts of parliament speak of the ligeance of England, &c. speaking briefly in a vulgar manner, are to be understood of the ligeance due by the people of England to the King; for no man will affirm that England itself, taking it for the continent thereof, doth owe any ligeance or faith, or that any faith or ligeance should be due to it: but it manifestly appeareth, that the ligeance or faith of the subject is proprium quarto modo to the King, omni, soli, et semper. 5 And oftentimes in the reports of our book cases and in acts of parliament also, the crown or kingdom is taken for the king himself.” &c. “Tenure in capite is a tenure of the Crown, and is a seigniorie in grosse,6 that is of the person of the King.” And afterwards 6. b. 7 “for special purposes the law makes him a body politick, immortal and invisible, whereunto our allegiance cannot appertain.” I beg 348leave to observe here, that these words in the foregoing adjudication, that “the natural person of the King is ever accompanied with the politick capacity, and the politick capacity as it were appropriated to the natural capacity”; neither imply nor infer allegiance, or subjection to the politick capacity, because in the case of King James the first, his natural person was “accompanied” with three politick capacities at least, as King of England, Scotland and Ireland: yet the allegiance of an Englishman to him did not imply or infer subjection, to his politick capacity as King of Scotland.

Another place in which this distinction is to be found is in Moore's reports,8 p. 790. “The case of the union of the realm of Scotland with England.” And this deliberation, I hope was solemn enough. This distinction was agreed on by commissioners of the English lords and commons in a conferrence with commissioners of the Scottish parliament, and after many arguments and consultations by the lord chancellor and all the judges, and afterwards adopted by the lords and commons of both nations. “The judges answered with one assent,” says the book, “that allegiance and laws were not of equiparation for six causes,” the sixth and last of which is, “allegiance followeth the natural person not the politick.” “If the king go out of England with a company of his servants, allegiance remaineth among his subjects and servants, altho' he be out of his own realm, whereto his laws are confined, &c. and to prove the allegiance to be tied to the body natural of the king, not to the body politick, the lord Coke cited the phrases of diverse statutes, &c. And to prove that allegiance extended further than the laws national, they (the judges) shewed that every king of diverse kingdoms, or dukedoms, is to command every people to defend any of his kingdoms, without respect of that nation where he is born; as if the king of Spain be invaded in Portugal, he may levy for defence of Portugal armies out of Spain, Naples, Castile, Millen, Flanders and the like; as a thing incident to the allegiance of all his subjects, to join together in defence of any of his territories, without respect of the extent of the laws of that nation where he was born; whereby it manifestly appeareth, that allegiance followeth the natural person of the king, and is not tied to the body politick respectively in every kingdom.”9 There is one observation, not immediately to the present point, but so connected with our controversy, that it ought not to be overlooked. “For the matter of the great seal the judges shewed that the seal was alterable by the king at his pleasure, and he might make one seal for both kingdoms, for seals, coin, and leagues, are of absolute prerogative of the king without parliament, nor re-349strained to any assent of the people.” “But for further resolution of this point, how far the great seal doth command out of England, they made this distinction, that the great seal was current for remedials which groweth on complaint of the subjects, and thereupon writs are addressed under the great seal of England, which writs are limitted, their precinct to be within the places of the jurisdiction of the court that was to give the redress of the wrong. And therefore writs are not to go into Ireland nor the Isles, nor Wales, nor the counties palatine, because the king's courts here have not power to hold plea of lands, nor things there. But the great seal, hath a power preceptory, to the person, which power extendeth to any place, where the person may be found.” Ludlow's case, &c. who “being at Rome, a commandment under the great seal was sent for him to return,” &c. “So Bertie's case in Q. Mary's time, and Inglefield's case in Q. Elizabeth's, the privy seal went to command them to return into the realm, and for not coming their lands were seized”. &c. But to return to the point, “And as to the objection,” says the book, “that none can be born a natural subject of two kingdoms, they denied that absolutely, for altho' locally, he can be born, but in one, yet effectually, the allegiance of the King extending to both, his birthright shall extend to both.” And afterwards, “but that his kingly power extendeth to diverse nations and kingdoms, all owe him equal subjection, and are equally born to the benefit of his protection; and altho' he is to govern them by their distinct laws, yet any one of the people coming into the other, is to have the benefit of the laws, wheresoever he cometh; but living in one, or for his livelihood in one, he is not to be taxed in the other, because laws ordain taxes, impositions, and charges, as a discipline of subjection particularized to every particular nation.”10

Another place where this distinction is to be found is in Foster's crown law,11 p. 184. “There have been writers, who have carried the notion of natural, perpetual, unalienable allegiance, much farther than the subject of this discourse will lead me. They say, very truly, that it is due to the person of the king, &c.” “It is undoubtedly due to the person of the king; but in that respect natural allegiance differeth nothing from that we call local. For allegiance considered in every light is alike due to the person of the king; and is paid, and in the nature of things must be constantly paid, to that prince, who for the time being, is in the actual and full possession of the regal dignity.”

Indeed allegiance to a sovereign lord, is nothing more than fealty to a subordinate lord, and in neither case, has any relation to, or 350connection with laws or parliaments, lords or commons. There was a reciprocal confidence between the lord and vassal. The lord was to protect the vassal in the enjoyment of his land. The vassal was to be faithful to his lord, and defend him against his enemies. This obligation on the part of the vassal, was his fealty, fidelitas. The oath of fealty, by the feodal law to be taken by the vassal or tenant, is nearly in the very words as the ancient oath of allegiance. But neither fealty, allegiance, or the oath of either implied any thing about laws, parliaments, lords or commons.

The fealty and allegiance of Americans then is undoubtedly due to the person of king George the third, whom God long preserve and prosper. It is due to him, in his natural person, as that natural person is intituled to the crown, the kingly office, the royal dignity of the realm of England. And it becomes due to his natural person, because he is intituled to that office. And because by the charters, and other express and implied contracts made between the Americans and the kings of England, they have bound themselves to fealty and allegiance to the natural person of that prince, who shall rightfully hold the kingly office in England, and no otherwise.

“With us in England,” says Blackstone, v. 1. 367. “it becoming a settled principle of tenure, that all lands in the kingdom are holden of the king as their sovereign and lord paramount, &c. the oath of allegiance was necessarily confined to the Person of the king alone. By an easy analogy, the term of allegiance was soon brought to signify all other engagements, which are due from subjects to their prince, as well as those duties which were simply and merely territorial. And the oath of allegiance, as administered for upwards of six hundred years, contained a promise 'to be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear of life and limb and terrene honour, and not to know, or hear of any ill or damage intended him, without defending him therefrom.'” “But at the revolution, the terms of this oath, being thought perhaps to favour too much the notion of non resistance, the present form was introduced by the convention parliament, which is more general and indeterminate than the former, the subject only promising 'that he will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the king,' without mentioning his heirs, or specifying in the least wherein that allegiance consists.”

Thus, I think, that all the authorities in law, coincide, exactly with the observation which I have heretofore made upon the case of Wales, and shew that subjection to a king of England, does not necessarily imply subjection to the crown of England; and that 351subjection to the crown of England, does not imply subjection to the parliament of England, for allegiance is due to the person of the king, and to that alone, in all three cases, that is, whether we are subject to his parliament and crown, as well as his person, as the people in England are, whether we are subject to his crown and person, without parliament, as the Welch were after the conquest of Lewellyn, and before the union, or as the Irish were after the conquest and before Poyning's law, or whether we are subject to his person alone, as the Scots were to the king of England, after the accession of James ist, being not at all subject to the parliament or crown of England.

We do not admit any binding authority in the decisions and adjudications of the court of king's bench or common pleas, or the court of chancery over America: but we quote them as the opinions of learned men. In these we find a distinction between a country conquered, and a country discovered. Conquest, they say gives the crown an absolute power: discovery, only gives the subject a right to all the laws of England. They add, that all the laws of England are in force there. I confess I don't see the reason of this. There are several cases in books of law, which may be properly thrown before the public. I am no more of a lawyer than Massachusettensis, but have taken his advice, and conversed with many lawyers upon our subject, some honest, some dishonest, some living, some dead, and am willing to lay before you what I have learned from all of them. In Salk.12 411. the case of Blankard vs Galdy–“In debt upon a bond, the defendant prayed oyer of the condition, and pleaded the stat. E. 6 against buying offices concerning the administration of justice; and averred that this bond was given for the purchase of the office of provost marshall in Jamaica, and that it concerned the administration of justice, and that Jamaica is part of the revenue and possessions of the crown of England: The plantiff replied, that Jamaica is an island beyond the seas, which was conquered from the Indians and Spaniards in Q. Elizabeth's time, and the inhabitants are governed by their own laws, and not by the laws of England: The defendant rejoined, that before such conquest, they were governed by their own laws; but since that, by the laws of England: Shower argued for the plantiff, that on a judgment in Jamaica, no writ of error lies here, but only an appeal to the council; and as they are not represented in our parliament, so they are not bound by our statutes, unless specially named. Vid. And.13 115. Pemberton contra argued, that by the conquest of a nation, its liberties, rights and properties, are quite lost; 352that by consequence their laws are lost too, for the law is but the rule and guard of the other; those that conquer cannot by their victory lose their laws, and become subject to others. Vid. Vaugh.14 405. That error lies here upon a judgment in Jamaica, which could not be if they were not under the same law. Et. per Holt, C. J. and Curia. 1st. In case of an uninhabited country, newly found out by English subjects, all laws in force in England are in force there; so it seemed to be agreed. 2. Jamaica being conquered, and not pleaded to be parcel of the kingdom of England, but part of the possessions and revenue of the crown of England; the laws of England did not take place there, until declared so by the conquerer, or his successors. The isle of Man and Ireland are part of the possessions of the crown of England; yet retain their ancient laws; that in Davis15 36. it is not pretended, that the custom of tanistry was determined by the conquest of Ireland, but by the new settlement made there after the conquest: that it was impossible the laws of this nation, by mere conquest without more should take place in a conquered country; because for a time, there must want officers without which our laws can have no force; that if our law did take place, yet they in Jamaica having power to make new laws, our general laws may be altered by theirs in particulars; also they held that in case of an infidel country, their laws by conquest do not entirely cease, but only such as are against the law of God; and that in such cases where the laws are rejected or silent, the conquered country shall be governed according to the rule of natural equity. Judgment, pro Quer.'”

Upon this case I beg leave to make a few observations. 1. That Shower's reasoning, that we are not bound by statutes because not represented in parliament, is universal, and therefore his exception “unless specially named,” altho' it is taken from analogy to the case of Ireland, by lord Coke and others, yet it is not taken from the common law, but is merely arbitrary and groundless, as applied to us. Because if the want of representation could be supplied, by “expressly naming” a country, the right of representation might be rendered null and nugatory. But of this more another time.

2d. That by the opinion of Holt, and the whole court, the laws of England, common and statute, are in force in a vacant country, discovered by Englishmen. But America, was not a vacant country, it was full of inhabitants; our ancestors purchased the land; but if it had been vacant, his lordship has not shewn us any authority at common law, that the laws of England would have been in force there. On the contrary, by that law it is clear they did not extend 353beyond seas, and therefore could not be binding there, any further than the free will of the discoverers should make them. The discoverers had a right by nature, to set up those laws, if they liked them, or any others, that pleased them better, provided they were not inconsistent with their allegiance to their king. 3d. The court held that a country must be parcel of the kingdom of England, before the laws of England could take place there; which seems to be inconsistent with what is said before, because discovery of a vacant country does not make it parcel of the kingdom of England, which shews, that the court, when they said that all laws in force in England, are in force in the discovered country, meant no more than that the discoverers had a right to all such laws, if they chose to adopt them. 4. The idea of the court, in this case, is exactly conformable to, if not taken from the case of Wales. They consider a conquered country as Ed. 1, and his successors did Wales, as by the conquest annexed to the crown, as an absolute property, possession, or revenue, and therefore to be disposed of at its will. Not intitled to the laws of England, although bound to be govern'd by the king's will, in parliament or out of it, as he pleased. 5. The isle of Man, and Ireland, are considered like Wales, as conquered countries, and part of the possessions (by which they mean property or revenue) of the crown of England, yet have been allowed by the king's will to retain their ancient laws. 6. That the case of America differs totally, from the case of Wales, Ireland, Man, or any other case, which is known at common law or in English history. There is no one precedent in point, in any English records, and therefore it can be determined only by eternal reason, and the law of nature. But yet that the analogy of all these cases of Ireland, Wales, Man, Chester, Durham, Lancaster, &c. clearly concur with the dictates of reason and nature, that Americans are intituled to all the liberties of Englishmen, and that they are not bound by any acts of parliament whatever, by any law known in English records or history, excepting those for the regulation of trade, which they have consented to and acquiesced in. 7. To these let me add, that as the laws of England, and the authority of parliament, were by common law confined to the realm and within the four seas, so was the force of the great seal of England. Salk. 510. “The great seal of England is appropriated to England, and what is done under it has relation to England, and to no other place.” So that the king by common law, had no authority to create peers or governments, or any thing out of the realm by his great seal, and therefore our charters and commissions to governors, being under 354the great seal, gives us no more authority, nor binds us to any other duties, than if they had been given under the privy seal, or without any seal at all. Their binding force, both upon the crown and us, is wholly from compact and the law of nature.

There is another case in which the same sentiments are preserved; it is in 2d. P. Williams,16 75. memorandum 9th August, 1722. “It was said by the master of the rolls to have been determined by the lords of the privy council, upon an appeal to the king in council from the foreign plantations, ist. That if there be a new and uninhabited country, found out by English subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so, wherever they go, they carry their laws with them, and therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England; tho' after such country is inhabited by the English, acts of parliament made in England, without naming the foreign plantations, will not bind them; for which reason, it has been determined that the statute of frauds and perjuries, which requires three witnesses, and that these should subscribe in the testators presence in the case of a devise of land, does not bind Barbadoes, but that, 2dly. Where the king of England conquers a country, it is a different consideration; for there the conqueror, by saving the lives of the people conquered, gains a right and property in such people! In consequence of which he may impose upon them what laws he pleases. But,

3dly. Until such laws, given by the conquering prince, the laws and customs of the conquered country shall hold place; unless where these are contrary to our religion, or enact any thing that is malum in se, or are silent; for in all such cases the laws of the conquering country shall prevail.”

NOVANGLUS
1.

Joseph Galloway, New York, 1775 (Evans, No. 14059).

2.

Sir Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. In English, Compleat in Thirteen Parts . . . , 7 vols. [London], 1727.

3.

Sir Thomas Egerton, Baron Ellesmere (1540?–1617), lord chancellor, 1603–1617; Sir Nicholas Hyde or Hide (d. 1631), barrister; Sir Henry Hobart (d. 1625), attorney for the plaintiffs in Calvin's Case; Sir John Croke (1553–1620), judge of King's Bench, 1607–1620 ( DNB ).

4.

A printer's error; the reference is to 7 Rep. 11b.

5.

Property in the fourth part . . . to each, to him alone and forever.

6.

A lord without a manor and thus unable to keep a court.

7.

An error for 7 Rep. 12b.

8.

Cases Collect & Report . . . per Sir Fra. Moore . . .

9.

Same, p. 798–799.

10.

All of the preceding quotations are from same, p. 804–805.

11.

Sir Michael Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission of Oyer and Terminer . . . and of Other Crown Cases . . .

12.

William Salkeld, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of King's Bench . . . from the Revolution to the Tenth Year of Q. Anne, 3d edn., 2 vols. in 1, London, 1731, 1732 ( Catalogue of JA's Library ). The long quotation, including the next three citations, is from p. 411–412, note.

355 13.

Probably Sir Edmund Anderson, Les Reports du treserudite Edmund Anderson . . . Chief Justice del Common-bank . . . , 2 vols. in 1, London, 1664–1665.

14.

Probably Sir John Vaughan, The Reports and Arguments of . . . Sir John Vaughan, London, 1677.

15.

Probably Sir John Davies, Le primer report des cases et matters en ley resolues et adiuges en les Courts del Roy en Ireland . . . , Dublin, 1615; English transl., A Report of Cases and Matters in Law, Resolved and Adjudged in the King's Courts in Ireland, Dublin, 1762.

16.

William Peere Williams, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Chancery [1695–1734] and of Some Special Cases Adjudged in the Court of King's Bench . . . , 2 vols., London, 1740.